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The arm-of-the-state doctrine, which entitles certain governmental entities to 
the states’ sovereign immunity, is an embodiment of American federalism. In theory, 
this doctrine ensures that federal courts appreciate the concerns for state sovereignty 
and solvency that motivated the passage of the Eleventh Amendment. However, a 
combination of factors—the Supreme Court’s sparse guidance, the growth and dif-
fusion of power across local, state, and federal governments, and the availability of 
other immunity doctrines—has rendered the arm-of-the-state doctrine an incompre-
hensible anachronism. Most courts determine whether an entity defendant receives 
arm-of-the-state immunity by examining the entity’s legal status and structure. But 
many courts applying “entity-based” reasoning either reach overbroad conclusions 
that limit recoveries of future litigants or avoid applying the arm-of-the-state doc-
trine at all—and sometimes a circuit does a bit of both. 
This Comment proposes a reworking of the arm-of-the-state doctrine to make 
it more suitable for application to modern government, in which local, state, and 
federal entities interact through a complex web of relationships. Under the proposed 
approach, courts apply their arm-of-the-state tests only to the entity activity at issue 
in a lawsuit, rather than to the entity as a whole. This “activity-based” approach 
narrows the scope of arm-of-the-state holdings so that they more accurately reflect 
allocations of power between a state and a local entity, which can vary according to 
the activity that a local entity performs. The activity-based approach is consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s arm-of-the-state jurisprudence and parallels the Court’s 
approach to evaluating entities under the municipal liability doctrine. The proposed 
adaptation might well encourage more, and more consistent, application of the doc-
trine, reintroducing federalism concerns into analyses of state-local relationships. 
Further, the activity-based approach both aligns defendants’ liability more closely 
with control and ensures that potential future plaintiffs retain access to the federal 
courts over truly local entity action. Narrowing the doctrine’s scope ensures that it 
protects fully and only the action that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to 
protect. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A police officer suspects someone of being an undocumented 
immigrant and detains them.1 Later, that individual sues the lo-
cal police department in federal court for establishing a policy of 
hardline immigration enforcement that violated their Fourth 
 
 1 This Comment consciously uses the singular “they.” While it is not “considered 
fully acceptable in formal writing, [it is] steadily gaining ground.” The Chicago Manual of 
Style, § 5.256 (Chicago 17th ed 2017). 
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Amendment rights. The department defends itself by asserting 
that it is an “arm of the state”—an entity so closely bound up with 
the state that it accesses the state’s sovereign immunity under 
the Eleventh Amendment,2 exempting the department from suit 
in federal court. Will the department succeed in its defense and 
get the case dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction? 
Based on the current legal landscape, this question remains 
unresolved. Different circuits apply different tests for determin-
ing whether a local entity is an arm of the state entitled to Elev-
enth Amendment immunity. Most circuits assume that an entity 
either is or is not an arm of the state, and that status applies re-
gardless of the activity at issue (an approach this Comment refers 
to as “entity-based”). Other circuits consider the activity at issue 
and the strength of the state’s relationship with the entity in regard 
to that activity (an approach this Comment refers to as “activity-
based”). Notably, the latter approach allows an entity’s arm-of-
the-state status to vary depending on the nature of the entity’s 
challenged activity. 
When courts apply an entity-based arm-of-the-state test me-
chanically, there are predictable problems of over- and underin-
clusiveness. The practical effects on plaintiffs of a finding that the 
defendant is an arm of the state are that (1) plaintiffs may not be 
able to get a federal court to evaluate a given policy that they be-
lieve is unconstitutional, and (2) they may lose the ability to sue 
that defendant over unrelated actions in the future. 
Theoretically, even if the local entity is deemed an arm of the 
state and is thus out of a federal court’s reach, plaintiffs may still 
sue local officers who carried out the policy in their individual ca-
pacities. However, this provides limited practical recourse.3 Quali-
fied immunity “gives government officials breathing room to 
 
 2 “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” US Const 
Amend XI. 
 3 For a nuanced discussion of qualified immunity’s role in litigation, see Joanna C. 
Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 Yale L J 2, 36–51 (2017). Professor 
Schwartz observes that “[a]lthough qualified immunity is rarely the [formal] reason that 
Section 1983 cases end, there are other ways in which qualified immunity doctrine might 
influence the litigation of constitutional claims against law enforcement.” Id at 50. When 
suits actually proceed past that question, “[p]olice officers are virtually always indemni-
fied” by their municipal employers. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 NYU 
L Rev 885, 936–37 (2014) (explaining empirical results). While this poses problems for the 
“assumptions of financial responsibility relied upon in civil rights doctrine,” this would not 
be too much of a problem for plaintiffs if the goal is merely compensation. Id at 890. But 
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make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal ques-
tions,”4 and protects officers from damages suits as long as their 
conduct does not violate “clearly established law.”5 There is little 
guidance on “how factually similar a prior decision must be to the 
instant case in order for the law to be ‘clearly established.’”6 If an 
officer is following or establishing an official policy, presumably 
the policy’s constitutionality is at least a colorable legal question. 
Under the “clearly established” standard required to overcome 
the qualified immunity of individual officers, such ambiguity 
likely means an officer acting pursuant to an official policy is en-
titled to qualified immunity if sued personally. This means that a 
plaintiff’s only viable option is to sue the local entity over the pol-
icy.7 Thus, a court holding that the entity is an arm of the state 
on an entity-wide basis can severely impede potential plaintiffs’ 
access to justice. 
A mechanical application of the entity-based arm-of-the-state 
approach can harm defendants in its indiscriminate broadness, 
as well. For example, a conclusion that defendants are not arms 
of the state means that they face liability in the future for actions 
mandated by state policies they cannot influence. Adding to all 
these problems, however, is that circuits employing an entity-
based approach often do not apply their doctrine mechanically. 
Anticipating the issues discussed above, these circuits sometimes 
try to twist out of the entity-based strictures or avoid applying 
 
as described above, the qualified immunity doctrine in the context of dubiously constitu-
tional official policy likely provides a barrier that most plaintiffs cannot overcome. 
 4 Ashcroft v al-Kidd, 563 US 731, 743 (2011). 
 5 Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 (1982). The Supreme Court has even com-
mented that the qualified immunity doctrine protects “all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v Briggs, 475 US 335, 341 (1986). 
 6 Schwartz, 89 NYU L Rev at 893 (cited in note 3). See also Charles R. Wilson, “Lo-
cation, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 
NYU Ann Surv Am L 445, 447–48, 459 (2000) (discussing the “philosophical challenge” 
posed by the “clearly established” standard and circuits’ different interpretive approaches). 
 7 It is helpful to plaintiffs that courts do not see qualified immunity as bearing on 
the question of municipal liability. See, for example, Bass v Pottawatomie County Public 
Safety Center, 425 Fed Appx 713, 718 (10th Cir 2011) (rejecting a municipality’s incon-
sistent verdict argument in response to the jury finding the municipality liable while the 
individual officer was protected by qualified immunity); Christensen v Park City Municipal 
Corp, 554 F3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir 2009) (finding individual officers to be protected by 
qualified immunity but that “[t]he defense of qualified immunity is not available to a 
municipality such as Park City”); Watson v City of Kansas City, 857 F2d 690, 697 (10th 
Cir 1988) (“[T]here is nothing anomalous about allowing [ ] a suit [against the city] to 
proceed when immunity [based on a lack of clearly established law] shields the individual 
defendants.”). 
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the arm-of-the-state doctrine altogether.8 They may seek refuge 
in the other immunity doctrines, all of which use activity-specific 
reasoning to capture the intricacies of the modern administrative 
state. These other doctrines explain, for example, that govern-
ment officials are protected from money damages suits instituted 
against them individually, either through “absolute” immunity 
(for certain functions)9 or qualified, good-faith immunity (for 
every other function).10 State governments are usually immune 
through the Eleventh Amendment.11 Under the municipal liabil-
ity doctrine, local governmental entities are immune from § 1983 
liability unless their “official municipal policy of some nature 
caused a constitutional tort.”12 When courts seek to avoid the 
“hammer” of an entity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine in favor of 
the “scalpels” available in other immunity doctrines, they reduce 
the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s relevance in contexts they find 
particularly troublesome—and reduce the coherence of the cir-
cuit’s arm-of-the-state doctrine as a whole. The entity-based in-
terpretation and the struggles to implement it prevent the arm-
of-the-state doctrine from being able to work substantive justice 
by properly aligning liability with power within state-local 
relationships. 
This Comment argues that the circuit split over an activity-
based or entity-based arm-of-the-state inquiry should be resolved 
in favor of the former. Further, it provides a model for this adap-
tation: each circuit should add into its existing arm-of-the-state 
test an activity hinge factor. Just as the term “hinge” implies a 
 
 8 See Part II.C.1. 
 9 See, for example, Forrester v White, 484 US 219, 223–24 (1988) (explaining the 
policy motivations behind absolute immunity findings). 
 10 See generally, for example, Procunier v Navarette, 434 US 555 (1978) (prison offi-
cials have good faith immunity); Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308 (1975) (school officials 
have good faith immunity); Pierson v Ray, 386 US 547 (1967) (police officers have a defense 
of good faith against § 1983 claims). 
 11 However, Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity by making a clear 
statement of intent to abrogate it and acting pursuant to constitutional authority. Although 
Article I of the Constitution does not give Congress the power to strip states of their sov-
ereign immunity, Congress can use powers conferred by Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Tennessee v Lane, 541 US 509, 517 
(2004). It is important to note that Congress has not abrogated sovereign immunity with 
respect to individual suits alleging civil rights violations against local or state entities, 
which are the topic of this Comment. 
 12 Monell v Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 US 658, 691 
(1978). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.6 at 561 (7th ed Aspen 
2016). For a discussion of § 1983 liability, see Part I.A.3. 
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device that allows flexibility in a machine, the activity hinge fac-
tor in the arm-of-the-state test allows courts to adjust the level of 
abstraction at which they consider the test’s other factors. Apply-
ing the activity hinge factor first, the court uses state law to de-
fine the activity that the defendant was engaged in when the 
harm giving rise to suit occurred. Then, the court considers the 
test’s other factors—such as state intent, monetary impact, and 
state control—only as they relate to that particular activity. The 
activity hinge factor’s scope-defining function is modeled on the 
municipal liability doctrine’s threshold process for defining the 
scope of its own analysis.13 Before analyzing whether a municipal-
ity may be sued under 42 USC § 1983, the municipal liability doc-
trine uses state law to define the relevant activity at the outset. 
This activity-specific use of state law, familiar to all of the cir-
cuits, thus provides a means by which a circuit can narrow the 
scope of its arm-of-the-state test’s other factors. This allows the 
factors bearing on sovereign immunity concerns to focus on the 
state’s relationship with the local entity within the activity at is-
sue, not in the abstract. 
Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit already illustrates what is pos-
sible with a narrow, activity-specific approach. That circuit di-
vides its factors into two subsequent steps, the first of which is 
deciding what activity will be evaluated. In the second step, 
courts in this circuit evaluate the other four factors in the circuit’s 
arm-of-the-state test only as they relate to the specific activity.14 
The Eleventh Circuit does not explicitly use the municipal li-
ability doctrine for guidance. This Comment suggests that cir-
cuits should do so not because the municipal liability doctrine’s 
guidance is necessary, but rather because it offers entity-based 
courts an easier transition to a new mode of analysis, relying on 
something they already know. 
There are many reasons for adopting an activity-based arm-
of-the-state doctrine. In addition to realizing the doctrine’s poten-
tial to do substantive justice through narrower, more accurate 
holdings, an activity-based approach achieves broader constitu-
tional objectives. A narrower approach to sovereign immunity 
 
 13 Part I.A.3 discusses the historical development and substantive analysis of the 
municipal liability doctrine. Part III discusses the threshold inquiry and how it may be 
incorporated into this Comment’s proposed activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine. 
 14 See, for example, Lake v Skelton, 840 F3d 1334, 1337–38 (11th Cir 2016) (explain-
ing the Eleventh Circuit’s two-part arm-of-the-state test). This approach is further dis-
cussed in Part II.B. 
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would allow the Eleventh Amendment and general federalism 
principles to be more effectively realized in modern government. 
Current governmental entities are myriad and include intricately 
designed allocations of federal, state, and local power. An arm-of-
the-state doctrine that awards or withholds sovereign immunity 
in one fell swoop over an entity cannot accurately capture the nu-
anced state-local relationships that exist in modern government. 
In order to ensure that the modern arm-of-the-state doctrine pro-
tects fully and only the entity behavior that the Eleventh Amend-
ment was intended to protect, it needs an activity-based update. 
Additionally, this shift would harmonize the level of abstrac-
tion at which existing arm-of-the-state test factors are applied 
with the level of abstraction employed in other immunity doc-
trines. This cross-doctrinal harmony would reduce the incentive 
for courts to twist or avoid the arm-of-the-state doctrine and cre-
ate unpredictable results. It would also offer the Supreme Court 
a more consistent and predictable legal basis for clarifying which 
arm-of-the-state factors are most important for sovereign immun-
ity purposes, and to what degree. 
This Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I sketches the 
purposes and substance of the relevant immunity doctrines before 
delving into the Supreme Court’s sparse guidance on how to iden-
tify arms of the state. Part II details the existing split between 
circuits that use an entity-based approach when deciding whether 
an entity is an arm of the state and those that use an activity-
based approach. Part III explains how the municipal liability doc-
trine’s threshold inquiry may be implemented as the doctrinal 
guide for entity-based circuits, allowing these circuits to adopt an 
activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine without wholly giving up 
their existing arm-of-the-state tests. Part III also addresses why 
the municipal liability doctrine is the correct choice for this role, 
compared to other activity-based immunity doctrines. Finally, 
Part IV addresses the broader reasons justifying the activity-
based shift. 
I.  BACKGROUND LAW 
This Comment focuses on the arm-of-the-state doctrine, an 
outgrowth of the Eleventh Amendment’s sovereign immunity for 
states. However, understanding other immunity doctrines sheds 
light on the far-reaching implications of the entity-based arm-of-
the-state doctrine and this Comment’s recommendation to rein it 
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in. To that end, this Part gives an overview of the various immun-
ity doctrines implicated by this Comment. It includes the munici-
pality doctrine, which is not strictly speaking an immunity doc-
trine but rather an immunity-creating schema of statutory 
construction. This Part then delves into the arm-of-the-state doc-
trine’s development at the Supreme Court. 
A. Immunity Doctrines Broadly 
This Section considers the Eleventh Amendment, which pro-
tects the states from being haled into federal court against their 
will, and various immunities besides arm-of-the-state immunity 
that apply to officers or entities. 
1. The Eleventh Amendment and the birth of the arm-of-
the-state doctrine. 
Passed by Congress in 1794 and ratified by the states in 1795, 
the Eleventh Amendment states, “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State.”15 In plain language, the text of this Amend-
ment disallows any citizen of a different or foreign state from su-
ing a state in federal court. The principal motivation for the 
amendment was the states’ concern that “federal courts would 
force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts, leading to their 
financial ruin.”16 In Hans v Louisiana,17 the Court interpreted the 
Amendment even more broadly, explaining that the country’s 
foundational principles, if not the text of the Amendment itself, 
rendered the states immune from suits brought by their own citi-
zens as well.18 
While the financial aspect was the most concrete interest mo-
tivating the Amendment, the Amendment protects an ideal of 
American federalism as well: the dignity of the states within the 
 
 15 US Const Amend XI. 
 16 Hess v Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 US 30, 39 (1994), quoting 
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v Halderman, 465 US 89, 151 (1984) (Stevens dis-
senting). The Eleventh Amendment was enacted in response to the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Chisholm v Georgia, 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793), in which the Court recognized the 
right of those who were not citizens of a given state to sue that state. Id at 431. 
 17 134 US 1 (1890). 
 18 Id at 21 (declaring the “rule which exempts a sovereign state from prosecution in 
a court of justice at the suit of individuals”). 
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republican system. “The very object and purpose of the [Eleventh] 
Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to 
the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private 
parties.”19 Being summoned as a defendant in such a suit “was 
thought to be neither becoming nor convenient” for a state.20 As 
such, the “Amendment is rooted in a recognition that the States, 
although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, in-
cluding sovereign immunity.”21 In the modern era, the Court re-
fers to financial liability and state dignity as “the Eleventh 
Amendment’s twin reasons for being.”22 
The arm-of-the-state doctrine imputes to certain qualifying 
local entities a state’s Eleventh Amendment protection. Tradi-
tionally, states and their agencies gain the protection,23 while 
counties and municipalities do not.24 The reason for this was that 
the state “design[s]” the “internal structure” of state agencies, 
while political subdivisions such as cities, towns, and counties 
“function as independent corporate bodies.”25 At one time, this dis-
tinction directly implicated whether a money judgment would be 
satisfied from the state treasury.26 Thus, as the doctrine has de-
veloped, the essential question has become whether the defend-
ant organization—a school board, a county, a city—is “an arm of 
 
 19 In re Ayers, 123 US 443, 505 (1887). 
 20 Id. 
 21 Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v Metcalf & Eddy, Inc, 506 US 139, 146 
(1993). See also Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 13 (1890), quoting Alexander Hamilton. See 
Federalist 81 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 541, 548 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed) 
(“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual 
without its consent.”) (emphasis in original). 
 22 Hess, 513 US at 47. 
 23 See, for example, Will v Michigan Department of State Police, 491 US 58, 66 (1989); 
Alabama v Pugh, 438 US 781, 782 (1978) (holding that a suit against the State Board of 
Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment). 
 24 See, for example, Moor v County of Alameda, 411 US 693, 717–21 (1973) (conclud-
ing that a municipality is “treated as a citizen of California” rather than an arm of the 
state); Lincoln County v Luning, 133 US 529, 530 (1890) (holding that a municipality is 
not an arm of the state but “part of the State only in that remote sense in which any city, 
town, or other municipal corporation may be said to be a part of the State”). 
 25 Alex E. Rogers, Note, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Im-
munity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 Colum L Rev 
1243, 1246 (1992). See also Luning, 133 US at 530. 
 26 See Ford Motor Co v Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 US 459, 464 (1945). 
See also Pennhurst, 465 US at 101 (describing the test as whether the state is “the real, 
substantial party in interest”). 
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the State partaking of the State’s Eleventh Amendment immun-
ity” rather than a “political subdivision to which the Eleventh 
Amendment does not extend.”27 
The alignment between money judgments running against 
the state treasury and the distinction between political subdivi-
sions and state agencies has become less clear, however, assum-
ing it was ever as clear as the Court thought.28 As for the political 
subdivision–state agency distinction, modern entities often blend 
features of the two, leaving courts in a bind when classifying an 
entity for Eleventh Amendment purposes.29 The difficulties in 
classifying are compounded by the fact that the Court has not 
given any definitive guidance on what features matter, and how 
much, in determining whether an entity is a state arm or not.30 
2. Immunity for officers. 
Immunity for government officials refers to immunity for gov-
ernment actors in their personal capacity—when the plaintiff 
seeks damages from the individual officer.31 This principle has a 
long history and an important practical purpose. Some degree of 
immunity from liability is necessary to ensure that government 
actors continue to perform their duties without fear of lawsuits 
chilling their legitimate activity. However, courts have to balance 
that interest against the values of compensating plaintiffs for 
harms and deterring government officials from behaving inappro-
priately.32 In an effort to balance these dueling needs, courts have 
established an array of immunity doctrines. 
Absolute immunity protects those performing judicial, legis-
lative, and prosecutorial functions. The “focus is on the function 
 
 27 Mount Healthy City School District v Doyle, 429 US 274, 280 (1977). 
 28 See Part II.C.2 for a more detailed discussion of the monetary judgment factor and 
its role in entity-based arm-of-the-state doctrines. 
 29 See Rogers, Note, 92 Colum L Rev at 1247 (cited in note 25) (discussing the diffi-
culties presented by interstate port authorities, levee boards, tourism companies, indus-
trial insurance system agencies, potato commissions, and cement plants). 
 30 This tension and its implications for the arm-of-the-state doctrine are discussed in 
Part I.B. 
 31 See Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 806–08 (1982). When the plaintiff seeks 
damages from the official’s employer, the immunities and liabilities refer to the state or 
local entity. See McMillian v Monroe County, 520 US 781, 785 n 2 (1997) (explaining how 
a suit against an officer in his official capacity is a suit against the entity the officer 
represents). 
 32 See Harlow, 457 US at 807. See also Wood v Strickland, 420 US 308, 317–20 (1975) 
(explaining the reasoning and balancing of values underlying qualified and absolute im-
munity as applied in the school official context). 
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performed, rather than the title possessed.”33 Thus, an official 
may not successfully claim absolute immunity in the future for an 
activity merely because they previously obtained immunity for an 
unrelated activity. The Court has consistently attempted to limit 
absolute immunity.34 It “presum[es] [ ] that qualified rather than 
absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in 
the exercise of their duties” and thus limits absolute immunity 
protection to its scope at common law unless the official persuades 
the court that “immunity is justified for the function in ques-
tion.”35 For instance, the Court has granted absolute immunity 
only in regard to money damages for judicial acts,36 the legislative 
function,37 prosecutorial functions,38 and police officers in their ca-
pacity as witnesses.39 This core of absolutely immune functions 
has given rise to various subgroups. For example, some courts re-
fer to arm-of-the-sentencing-judge and quasi-judicial immunity, 
which derive from judicial immunity. These immunities similarly 
cover only certain relevant activities and not everything the de-
fendant could do.40 The Supreme Court has only granted absolute 
 
 33 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.6 at 568 (cited in note 12) (emphasis in 
original). 
 34 See, for example, Forrester v White, 484 US 219, 224 (1988) (“This Court has gen-
erally been quite sparing in its recognition of claims to absolute official immunity . . . [and] 
careful not to extend the scope of the protection further than its purposes require.”). See 
also Wood, 420 US at 320 (explaining that the common law development of school official 
immunity doctrine shows an “implicit” judgment “that absolute immunity would not be 
justified since it would not sufficiently increase the ability of school officials to exercise 
their discretion in a forthright manner to warrant the absence of a remedy for students 
subjected to intentional or otherwise inexcusable deprivations”). 
 35 Burns v Reed, 500 US 478, 486–87. 
 36 See, for example, Stump v Sparkman, 435 US 349, 358–59 (1978) (holding that a 
judge who issued an order to sterilize a fifteen-year-old girl, without any case filed, was 
entitled to absolute immunity for giving that order). A federal statute, the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1996, later extended absolute immunity for judges from only suits for 
monetary judgments to suits for injunctive relief as well. Pub L No 104-317, § 309(c), 110 
Stat 3847, 3853, codified at 42 USC § 1983. 
 37 Federal congresspersons and their aides are absolutely immune from suits for 
damages and prospective relief. US Const, Art I, § 6. The Court has bestowed similar ab-
solute immunity on state and local legislators for suits for money damages and equitable 
remedies. See Bogan v Scott-Harris, 523 US 44, 52 (1998). All of this immunity, however, 
only applies to legislative tasks. See Gravel v United States, 408 US 606, 625 (1972). 
 38 See, for example, Imbler v Pachtman, 424 US 409, 424 (1976) (recognizing a pros-
ecutor’s immunity from suit for damages for knowingly using perjured testimony to incar-
cerate an innocent person for nine years). 
 39 See generally Briscoe v LaHue, 460 US 325 (1983) (providing absolute immunity 
to a police officer who gave perjured testimony from a damages suit). 
 40 See, for example, Walrath v United States, 35 F3d 277, 282 (7th Cir 1994) (discuss-
ing how “[m]ost federal courts . . . [hold] that parole board members are absolutely 
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immunity that is not limited to the performance of certain func-
tions to the President of the United States.41 
A government official enjoys qualified immunity, or good-
faith immunity, when they are acting in the scope of their em-
ployment but are not entitled to absolute immunity.42 Qualified 
immunity “represents the norm” for executive branch officials.43 
It only protects against suits for “liability for civil damages inso-
far as [the official’s] conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.”44 It does not protect against suits for injunc-
tive relief.45 Unlike other immunities such as absolute immunity 
and sovereign immunity, plaintiffs may overcome qualified im-
munity, but only by satisfying a very high burden.46 
3. The municipal liability doctrine. 
The municipal liability doctrine is not a common law immun-
ity doctrine but rather a matter of statutory construction that 
sometimes results in immunity for qualifying officials and enti-
ties. This doctrine determines which defendants may be sued un-
der 42 USC § 1983. This Comment distinguishes between (1) this 
doctrine’s threshold decision regarding the level of abstraction at 
which the court should conduct its substantive analysis, and 
(2) the substantive analysis that may practically result in im-
munity. This Section focuses on the substantive analysis of the 
 
immune from suit for their decisions to grant, deny, or revoke parole” and that those par-
ticular activities are entitled to arm-of-the-sentencing-judge immunity); Draine v Leavy, 
504 Fed Appx 494, 495 (6th Cir 2012) (recognizing that “quasi-judicial immunity does not 
apply to functions performed by state parole officers that are not judicial in nature”); Buck-
ley v Fitzsimmons, 509 US 259, 277 (1993) (explaining the “functional approach of Imbler, 
which conforms to the common-law theory,” and reaffirming the functional approach to 
immunity for executive officers); Imbler, 424 US at 430 (“[R]espondent’s activities were 
intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were func-
tions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force.”). 
 41 See Nixon v Fitzgerald, 457 US 731, 748–54 (1982). 
 42 See id at 764 (White dissenting). 
 43 Buckley, 509 US at 273, quoting Malley v Briggs, 475 US 335, 340 (1986). 
 44 Harlow, 457 US at 818. 
 45 See, for example, Valley v Rapides Parish School Board, 118 F3d 1047 (5th Cir 
1997) (upholding injunction against school board); Ying Jing Gan v City of New York, 996 
F2d 522 (2d Cir 1993) (recognizing a valid claim against a police department as to injunc-
tive relief, but not as to damages). See also Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.6 at 582 
(cited in note 12). 
 46 See, for example, Crawford-El v Britton, 523 US 574, 586–87 (1998). See also, for 
example, Medina v Cram, 252 F3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir 2001) (stating that “[a]fter a de-
fendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff”). 
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municipal liability doctrine to better situate the doctrine within 
the parties’ argumentative toolbox. Later, Part III examines the 
doctrine’s threshold inquiry, which informs this Comment’s pro-
posed activity-specific approach. 
Under § 1983, a plaintiff may bring a civil action against “per-
son[s]” for an alleged “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws” that occur “under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any 
State or Territory.”47 Because § 1983 forms “the basis for almost 
all constitutional rulings arising from the actions of state and lo-
cal governments and their officers,” the municipal liability doc-
trine effectively determines whether a local entity will be sued or 
not.48 The statute thus raises the question of who or what consti-
tutes a “person.” In Monroe v Pape,49 the Court gave its first an-
swer. The plaintiffs in Monroe sued the City of Chicago and cer-
tain officials, alleging an unreasonable search and seizure 
conducted “under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, 
customs and usages of Illinois and of the City of Chicago.”50 The 
Court held that the word “person” in § 1983 did not include mu-
nicipalities, and thus that the complaint against the City had 
been properly dismissed below.51 
In Monell v Department of Social Services of the City of New 
York,52 the Court changed its mind.53 In this case, female employ-
ees of the Department of Social Services and the New York Board 
of Education sued various municipal officials and entities under 
§ 1983.54 Plaintiffs challenged the defendants’ official policy “com-
pel[ing] pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence be-
fore such leaves were required for medical reasons.”55 The lower 
 
 47 42 USC § 1983. 
 48 Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.1 at 512 (cited in note 12). See also Debra 
L. Zorn, Municipal Liability under Section 1983 – Williams v. Butler, 18 Creighton L Rev 
1267, 1267 (1984) (“Civil rights actions based on section 1983 constitute almost one-third 
of all federal question litigation brought by private parties in federal courts.”), citing 
George Christie, Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts, 1115 n 1 (West 5th ed 1983). 
 49 365 US 167 (1961). 
 50 Id at 169 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 51 Id at 191–92. Monroe also explained that “under color of enumerated state author-
ity” for purposes of § 1983 included actions in which officials “abuse[d] [their] position.” 
Monroe, 365 US at 172 (quotation marks omitted). This aspect of Monroe remains good 
law, but it is not the focus of this Comment. 
 52 436 US 658 (1978). 
 53 Id at 694. 
 54 Id at 660–61. 
 55 Id at 661. 
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court agreed that the actions were unconstitutional, but it never-
theless denied plaintiffs’ request for backpay because any dam-
ages would have been paid by the City of New York.56 Granting 
that relief, the lower court reasoned, would “circumvent the im-
munity” that Monroe v Pape had previously conferred on munici-
palities sued under § 1983 when it held that local governments 
did not qualify as statutory people.57 On appeal, the Court re-
versed Monroe on that point, holding instead that local govern-
ments are “‘persons’ who may be defendants in § 1983 suits,”58 in 
addition to the officials themselves. More than a decade later, in 
Will v Michigan Department of State Police,59 the Court further 
clarified the statutory person by explaining that “neither a State 
nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ un-
der § 1983.”60 
These decisions taken together answer the question of whom, 
in a given case, a plaintiff can sue. Monell explained that local 
entities may only be sued over constitutional harms caused by 
their official policy or unofficial custom, not on a respondeat su-
perior theory for their employees’ constitutional torts.61 For a 
plaintiff to sue both the employee in a personal capacity and the 
entity, the constitutional tort must have occurred pursuant to the 
entity’s custom or official policy. Otherwise, the plaintiff may only 
sue the employee in a personal capacity.62 Will supplements the 
analysis by explaining that if the officials or the policy were at-
tributable to the state, not the local entity, then plaintiffs may 
sue neither the state nor the officials in their official capacity.63 In 
effect, plaintiffs cannot seek monetary damages if a government 
official or local entity acted pursuant to an official state policy.64 
 
 56 Monell, 436 US at 662. Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive and declaratory relief was 
held moot because after the complaint had been filed, the City and Board changed the 
harmful policy. Id at 661. 
 57 Id at 662 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 58 Id at 700–01. 
 59 491 US 58 (1989). 
 60 Id at 71. 
 61 Monell, 436 US at 663 n 7, 690–91. 
 62 Monell explained in a footnote that the ability to bring an official-capacity suit 
against an official runs with the ability to bring suit against the employing entity itself. 
See id at 690 n 55 (stating that a necessary implication of its holding was that “local gov-
ernment officials sued in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983” when the “lo-
cal government would be suable in its own name”). 
 63 Will, 491 US at 71 (explaining that a suit against an official’s office is “no different 
from a suit against the State itself”). 
 64 Plaintiffs may still sue state officials in their official capacities for injunctive relief 
for constitutional violations. Ex parte Young, 209 US 123, 159–60 (1908). In such a case, 
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Notably, this schematic interpretation of § 1983 reflects the 
complex distribution of state and local power in modern govern-
ment. Not everything that a local entity does is pursuant to a local 
policy; states can and do direct local entities and offices to conduct 
certain actions.65 The municipal liability doctrine is able to ac-
count for these nuances, while the entity-based arm-of-the-state 
doctrine—by judging a governmental entity as either entirely 
state or entirely local—cannot.66 
The Court articulated the municipal liability doctrine’s pro-
cess for deciding whether a policy or an official is truly local or 
state in character in McMillian v Monroe County.67 In this case, 
the plaintiff brought a § 1983 suit against the county and many 
officials after the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed 
his murder conviction because the state illegally suppressed evi-
dence.68 To determine whether the defendants could be sued un-
der § 1983, the Court first considered “whether Alabama sheriffs 
are policymakers for the State or for the county when they act in 
a law enforcement capacity.”69 
The Court noted that it was “not seeking to make a charac-
terization of Alabama sheriffs that will hold true for every type of 
official action they engage in,” but rather was evaluating whether 
the sheriff “represents the State or the county when he acts in a 
law enforcement capacity.”70 It explained that a plaintiff’s ability 
to sue a local entity or official under § 1983—whether they count 
as “persons”—depends on “whether [the implicated] governmen-
tal officials are final policymakers for the local government in a 
particular area.”71 If the official acts on behalf of a local entity, 
then the official and the local entity are both “persons” suable un-
der § 1983. If the official acts on behalf of the state, then the local 
 
the official “would be a person under § 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospec-
tive relief are not treated as actions against the State.” Will, 491 US at 71 n 10 (quotation 
marks omitted), quoting Kentucky v Graham, 473 US 159, 167 n 14 (1985). 
 65 See note 188. 
 66 This Comment focuses on the circuit split between what it terms entity-based and 
activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrines and recommends adopting the activity-based 
approach. Part II explains the differences and consequences of each approach. 
 67 520 US 781 (1997). 
 68 Id at 783–84. 
 69 Id at 785. 
 70 Id at 785–86. 
 71 McMillan, 520 US at 785. See also Jett v Dallas Independent School District, 491 
US 701, 737 (1989) (explaining the policymaker inquiry as “identify[ing] those officials or 
governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local govern-
mental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or 
statutory violation at issue”). 
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entity is not implicated by the official’s actions. As such, the local 
entity cannot be sued under the statute, and the “state” official 
can only be reached for injunctive relief.72 Rather than elucidating 
a particular test, the Court conducted a detailed, fact-intensive 
evaluation of the relevant state constitution and code.73 It con-
cluded that Alabama sheriffs were state officials in the particular 
activity of “law enforcement.”74 Thus, the county could not be sued 
because the policy was set by an effectively state-aligned official, 
not a local official. And the sheriff could not be sued in his official 
capacity, at least for damages, because he was a state official in 
the particular activity giving rise to the suit. 
All federal courts conduct the municipal liability analysis in 
accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in McMillian. For 
purposes of this Comment, the most significant feature of this 
analysis is that it results in narrow holdings. For example, future 
plaintiffs may still sue an Alabama sheriff if the unconstitutional 
actions were taken outside of the “law enforcement capacity.”75 
The municipal liability doctrine, then, practically provides a po-
tential activity-specific immunity to local entity defendants from 
§ 1983 suits. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Unclear, Case-by-Case Development 
of Its Arm-of-the-State Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court has faced the question of whether a local 
entity qualifies as an arm of the state many times over the years. 
In deciding this question, the Court has been inconsistent and has 
not definitively laid down a test for circuits to follow.76 A “tension 
 
 72 See notes 63–64. 
 73 McMillian, 520 US at 787–93. This substantive approach is different from that of 
the arm-of-the-state doctrine, which evaluates various factors in light of state law. This 
Comment advocates adopting only the municipal liability doctrine’s use of state law to 
identify and focus on the relevant activity at issue, not its substantive approach. See 
Part III. 
 74 McMillian, 520 US at 793. 
 75 Id at 786. This may seem like cold comfort, but, in fact, sheriffs can undertake 
many activities besides law enforcement, depending on state law. For example, in California, 
the activities of administering jails, investigating crimes, and obtaining and executing a 
search warrant are analyzed distinctly. See Hurth v County of Los Angeles, 2009 WL 
10699013, *2 (CD Cal) (providing an overview of the Ninth Circuit’s function-specific mu-
nicipal liability conclusions concerning sheriffs). 
 76 Jameson B. Bilsborrow, Comment, Keeping the Arms in Touch: Taking Political 
Accountability Seriously in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 64 Emory 
L J 819, 822, 827 (2015). One commentator has even referred to the doctrine as in a state 
of “disarray.” Rogers, Note, 92 Colum L Rev at 1296 (cited in note 25). 
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between two lines of Supreme Court decisions” concerning the 
factors’ relative weights has developed.77 In some cases, the Court 
finds the factor of whether a monetary judgment against the local 
entity would run against the state treasury to be decisive. In other 
cases, the Court has engaged in generalized balancing of what-
ever factors it seems to find relevant to the inquiry. The discus-
sion of cases below illustrates the development of this split 
chronologically. 
In Edelman v Jordan,78 the Court affirmed the significance of 
financial impact on the state treasury in the arm-of-the-state 
analysis.79 The plaintiff brought a class action for injunctive and 
declaratory relief, and the lower courts imposed a permanent in-
junction and required state officials to award retroactive bene-
fits.80 The Supreme Court reversed as to the retroactive payment, 
stating that a “suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability 
which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”81 The inquiry focused exclu-
sively on the monetary liability question. The Court also noted its 
longstanding position that a “county does not occupy the same po-
sition as a State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment,”82 but 
it suggested that there may be room for flexibility within this rule. 
It stated that county action is “generally” state action for Four-
teenth Amendment purposes, but a county defendant is “not nec-
essarily a state defendant” for purposes of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.83 This phrasing of the distinction suggests that some 
counties or “political subdivisions” could qualify as arms of the 
state and therefore be entitled to immunity. However, the Court 
did not go on to address the specific circumstances in which those 
qualifications would be met. 
Three years later in Mount Healthy City School District v 
Doyle,84 the Court formally introduced the term “arm of the 
State.”85 An untenured teacher sued the Mount Healthy school 
board for reinstatement and damages, claiming that the decision 
 
 77 Jonathan W. Needle, Note, The Arm of the State Analysis in Eleventh Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 6 Rev Litig 193, 196 (1987). 
 78 415 US 651 (1974). 
 79 Id at 667–71. 
 80 Id at 653–56. 
 81 Id at 663, 678. 
 82 Edelman, 415 US at 667 n 12, citing Luning, 133 US at 530. 
 83 Id. 
 84 429 US 274 (1977). 
 85 Id at 280. 
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to not rehire him violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.86 The district court found for the plaintiff teacher.87 As to 
the question of “whether the Board was entitled to immunity from 
suit in the federal courts under the Eleventh Amendment,” the 
district court found it “unnecessary” to reach “because it decided 
that any such immunity had been waived by Ohio statute and de-
cisional law.”88 The Supreme Court disagreed with that assess-
ment and decided to address the question.89 To do so, it engaged 
in a fact-intensive analysis of the entity’s characteristics.90 Even 
though the plaintiff’s requested remedy included monetary dam-
ages, the Court did not address whether a money judgment would 
run against the state treasury—the very question that Edelman 
suggested would be decisive in determining whether a defendant 
entity was an arm of the state.91 Mount Healthy stated that the 
answer to whether the local Board of Education was an arm of the 
state “depends, at least in part, upon the nature of the entity cre-
ated by state law.”92 The Court looked at the state statutory defi-
nitions of the entity, the entity’s monetary dependence on the 
state, and the state’s level of “guidance” or control over the en-
tity.93 It also noted that the local school boards in the state “have 
extensive powers to issue bonds” and “levy taxes within certain 
restrictions of state law”94—factors that could have easily related 
to the money judgment consideration key to Edelman. Yet with-
out looking in that direction, the Court concluded that “[o]n bal-
ance,” a local school board “is more like a county or city than it is 
like an arm of the State” and therefore is not entitled to sovereign 
immunity.95 
Edelman and Mount Healthy thus established two dueling 
lines of arm-of-the-state precedents, emphasizing different fac-
tors and providing little guidance as to which factors were deci-
sive or at least more significant. In subsequent cases, the Court 
added even more factual considerations to the arm-of-the-state 
 
 86 Id at 276, 282. 
 87 Id at 276. 
 88 Mount Healthy, 429 US at 279. 
 89 Id at 279–80. 
 90 Id at 280–81. 
 91 Id at 277 (analyzing suit for reinstatement and $50,000 in damages). See also note 
81 and accompanying text. 
 92 Mount Healthy, 429 US at 280. 
 93 Id at 280–81. 
 94 Id at 280. 
 95 Id. 
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inquiry. In Lake Country Estates, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency,96 a case about a bistate agency claiming immunity, the 
Court consolidated these earlier lines of cases, which were argu-
ably inconsistent. Lake Country mentions the Mount Healthy fac-
tors of state law’s characterization of the entity and the state’s 
level of guidance or control, which may be inferred from features 
such as a potential “veto” power over the entity’s decisions.97 It 
also considered the Edelman factor of whether the “state treasury 
[would be] directly responsible for judgments against” the en-
tity.98 In addition, it considered some new factors: whether the 
governing members were local or state officials, whether the en-
tity’s obligations bound a state, whether there was a history of 
litigation between the entity and the state (because such a history 
suggests a lack of state control), and whether the function that 
motivated the entity’s creation and led to the dispute in question 
was “traditionally . . . performed” at the local or state level.99 The 
Court did not mention the Mount Healthy factors of taxes and 
bonds, but it did observe that “[f]unding . . . must be provided by 
the counties, not the States.”100 
In Hess v Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp,101 the Court re-
affirmed the Lake Country factors and again included Edelman’s 
state treasury factor as one of many factors to consider.102 This 
time, however, it stated that “the prevention of federal-court judg-
ments that must be paid out of a State’s treasury” was the “impe-
tus” for the Eleventh Amendment.103 It discussed at length, and 
 
 96 440 US 391 (1979). 
 97 Id at 401–02. See also id at 401 & n 19 (referencing Mount Healthy before conduct-
ing its analysis). 
 98 Lake Country, 440 US at 402. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id at 401–02. This mandate was provided in the Compact Agreement, the agree-
ment made between the two states and consented to by Congress, which created the bi-
state entity raising the Eleventh Amendment claim. Id at 393–94. Lake Country’s facts, 
then, turned on the intricacies of the Agreement rather than state law. In later cases, the 
Court clarified that bistate agencies claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity under com-
pact agreements and local entities claiming Eleventh Amendment immunity under state 
law are evaluated the same way. See Auer v Robbins, 519 US 452, 456 n 1 (1997). See also 
generally Regents of the University of California v Doe, 519 US 425 (1997). Some courts, 
however, still recognize minute distinctions between arm-of-the-state doctrine applica-
tions to intrastate and Compact Clause entities. For example, the DC Circuit asserts that 
Hess “recognized a presumption against sovereign immunity for Compact Clause entities.” 
Puerto Rico Ports Authority v Federal Maritime Commission, 531 F3d 868, 872 (2008), 
citing Hess, 513 US at 42. 
 101 513 US 30 (1994). 
 102 Id at 48–53 (discussing the “state treasury factor”). 
 103 Id at 48. 
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with apparent approval, how most of the courts of appeals have 
identified the treasury factor as “the most salient factor in Elev-
enth Amendment determinations.”104 Hess stated that when the 
factors “point in different directions, the Eleventh Amendment’s 
twin reasons for being”—state solvency and dignity—“remain our 
prime guide.”105 Thus, if the many factors do not weigh conclu-
sively one way or the other, the monetary impact on the state 
treasury may practically be the decisive factor. One circuit court 
acknowledged that while Hess “at least indirectly identified the 
general factors to be considered,” the decision “is certain to gen-
erate confusion.”106 
The Court expanded on the relative significance of the mone-
tary judgment factor in Regents of the University of California v 
Doe.107 It clarified that state financial liability was “of considera-
ble importance,” but it also noted that the “question can be an-
swered only after considering the provisions of state law that de-
fine the agency’s character.”108 The Court explained: 
When deciding whether a state instrumentality may invoke 
the State’s immunity, our cases have inquired into the rela-
tionship between the State and the entity in question. In 
making this inquiry, we have sometimes examined the essen-
tial [monetary impact on the State] . . . and sometimes fo-
cused on the nature of the entity created by state law to de-
termine whether it should be treated as an arm of the 
State.109 
This language suggests that the fact-intensive considerations 
route illustrated in Mount Healthy and Lake Country and the 
monetary impact route embodied in Edelman are both acceptable 
analytical options for judges. However, the Court’s statement 
that state treasury monetary impact is of “considerable im-
portance” suggests that there are not truly two independent 
routes of analysis. Rather, these versions of the inquiry have be-
come jumbled over time, with the money judgment factor being 
adopted within the Mount Healthy–Lake Country fact-intensive 
approach as one of many considerations. However, the Court has 
seemingly endorsed the circuits’ interpretation that the monetary 
 
 104 Id. For the court’s full analysis of the state treasury factor, see also id at 48–53. 
 105 Hess, 513 US at 47. 
 106 Gray v Laws, 51 F3d 426, 431 (4th Cir 1995). 
 107 519 US 425 (1997). 
 108 Id at 430, 429 n 5. 
 109 Id at 429–30 (quotation marks omitted). 
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impact factor is the most significant one, although without clari-
fying exactly how significant it is or what exactly it entails.110 The 
Court referred to the prevention of monetary judgments against 
state treasuries as the “impetus” and one of the “Eleventh 
Amendment’s twin reasons for being.”111 
In sum, the doctrine has evolved from a clear but unmanage-
able rule into a jumble of factors within a generalized balancing 
test. The initial distinction between political subdivisions and en-
tities whose judgments would be paid by the state112 could not 
hold. As state governments and power expanded, it became clear 
that those two categories were not mutually exclusive. Political 
entities of a “hybrid” character have features of both state agen-
cies and largely independent public corporations, “defy[ing] 
straightforward definition.”113 Faced with this unmanageable le-
gal distinction, the Court gradually incorporated many other fac-
tors in addition to monetary judgment. Indeed, the Court possibly 
saw this evolution coming even in Edelman, the canonical mone-
tary judgment rule opinion, when it noted the existing Luning 
rule that “a county does not occupy the same position as a State 
for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment” but also hinted that a 
political corporation defendant might in some situations qualify 
as a “state defendant.”114 
While identifying and weighing the relevant factors in the 
arm-of-the-state analysis has occupied most courts’ and commen-
tators’ discussions of the arm-of-the-state doctrine,115 relatively 
scarce attention has been paid to the scope of entity activity to 
which courts do or should apply these factors. The next Section 
explores this doctrinal ambiguity. 
 
 110 The court stated that it is the “entity’s potential legal liability for judgments, ra-
ther than its ability or inability to require a third party to reimburse it, or to discharge 
the liability in the first instance, that is relevant in determining the underlying Eleventh 
Amendment question.” Id at 425. This language left a lot of ambiguity in the monetary 
judgment factor, which this Comment discusses in Part II.C.2. 
 111 Hess, 513 US at 47–48. 
 112 See Luning, 133 US at 530 (explaining that political corporations are “part of the 
State only in that remote sense in which any city, town, or other municipal corporation 
may be said to be” one and not entitling the defendant county to the state’s sovereign 
immunity). 
 113 Rogers, Note, 92 Colum L Rev at 1246–47 (cited in note 25). 
 114 Edelman, 415 US at 667 n 12. 
 115 See, for example, Hess, 513 US at 61 (O’Connor dissenting) (suggesting that the 
doctrine refocus on the factor of state control over the entity); Bilsborrow, Comment, 64 
Emory L J at 847 (cited in note 76) (proposing a new factor to be included in the analysis); 
Rogers, Note, 92 Colum L Rev at 1301 (cited in note 25) (proposing that courts conduct a 
two-step inquiry). 
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C. The Supreme Court’s Arm-of-the-State Opinions Have 
Created New Openings for Addressing and Clarifying the 
Scope of the Inquiry 
Supreme Court majority opinions have not definitively stated 
a preference between a broader arm-of-the-state test that focuses 
on the entity’s abstract relationship with the state and an activity-
specific one that considers the entity’s relationship with the state 
in regard to the particular action giving rise to suit. However, 
there are hints that the Court is becoming more receptive to the 
notion that what the entity was doing is relevant to the arm-of-
the-state inquiry—and, ultimately, the idea that an entity can be 
an arm of the state in the performance of some actions while not 
in others. 
For example, in Lake Country, the Court noted that “regula-
tion of land use is traditionally a function performed by local gov-
ernments. Concern with the proper performance of that function 
. . . was a primary motivation for the creation of [the entity] itself, 
and gave rise to the specific controversy at issue in this litiga-
tion.”116 The Court’s treatment of the “function,” or activity, in-
volved in the case is ambiguous in a few ways. The Court men-
tions that the land use regulation function (1) was the primary 
reason for creating the entity and thus its primary function, and 
(2) gave rise to this suit in particular. The Court nonetheless 
failed to clarify which of these two facts is more important. 
Hess further compounds the issue by not identifying what 
might happen if some of the entity’s activities are state activities 
while others are local activities. In Hess, two railroad workers 
filed separate personal injury actions against their employer, a 
bistate railway.117 In evaluating whether the defendant railway 
was an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immun-
ity, the Court noted that “Port Authority functions are not readily 
classified as typically state or unquestionably local,” because both 
states and municipalities perform them.118 Unable to categorize 
the activities as either state or local, the Court in Hess simply 
ignored this consideration, declaring that it “does not advance our 
Eleventh Amendment inquiry.”119 Thus, it is unclear how the 
Court wants judges to use an entity’s activities when determining 
 
 116 Lake Country, 440 US at 402. 
 117 Hess, 513 US at 33. 
 118 Id at 45. 
 119 Id. 
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the proper level of abstraction at which to analyze arm-of-the-
state factors. Is the question whether the entity’s primary activi-
ties or purposes are state functions, whether most of the entity’s 
activities are state functions, or whether the activity that gave 
rise to the suit is a state function? Although the first two ques-
tions are abstract in nature, the last question is rooted in the facts 
of each case. It asks what the entity was doing and how the state 
interacts with the entity with respect to the activity in question. 
In this third, activity-based formulation of the question, what the 
entity was created for and what proportion of its total statutory 
purposes can be categorized as state activities are irrelevant. 
What matters is the state’s relationship with the entity’s suit-
related activity. 
While Hess did not clarify whether the defendant’s activity 
giving rise to the suit matters in the arm-of-the-state analysis, 
Regents at least acknowledged that the doctrine is unsettled on 
the question of how to define the scope of entity action to which 
the many factors will be applied.120 The plaintiff in this case al-
leged that the University of California had wrongfully breached 
its agreement to employ him at a laboratory once it determined 
he could not acquire a necessary security clearance from the 
Department of Energy, which owned the laboratory.121 The dis-
trict court held that the University was an arm of the state im-
mune to the suit, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, largely on the ground that the Department of Energy’s 
contract with the University would indemnify the state for any 
judgment incurred while performing that contract, including this 
suit’s.122 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that legal lia-
bility, rather than financial liability and the state’s ability to find 
a third-party indemnifier, mattered in evaluating the monetary 
judgment factor.123 It also addressed but declined to “decide 
whether there may be some state instrumentalities that qualify 
as ‘arms of the State’ for some purposes but not others.”124 That 
possibility is, of course, a necessary conclusion of the activity-
based approach proposed in this Comment. 
 
 120 Indeed, the entity-based circuits have struggled to reconcile this uncertainty as to 
the scope of the arm-of-the-state analysis with their steadfast belief in the entity-based 
approach. This tension is especially evident in their handling of the monetary judgment 
factor, which is discussed in Part II.C.2. 
 121 Regents, 519 US at 426–27. 
 122 Id at 427–28. 
 123 Id at 431. 
 124 Id at 427 n 2. 
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A more recent case, Northern Insurance Co of New York v 
Chatham County, Georgia,125 offered further hints that the Court 
might be open to an activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine. In 
that case, the Court considered whether an insurance company 
could bring an admiralty suit against a county seeking damages 
stemming from a malfunctioning drawbridge incident.126 The 
Court did not fully engage with its arm-of-the-state analysis or 
comment negatively on any of its prior decisions, but it noted that 
determining the scope of the inquiry might be important. It 
phrased the relevant question as whether “the County . . . was 
acting as an arm of the State when it operated [a] drawbridge.”127 
This language suggests an activity-based approach based on 
“bridge operation” activities specifically. However, the Court did 
not dig any deeper into the inquiry before upholding the lower 
court’s ruling based on the defendant county’s concession that 
it did not qualify as an arm of the state entitled to sovereign 
immunity.128 
While these cases hardly show enthusiasm for clarifying 
the scope of the arm-of-the-state inquiry one way or the other, 
they do create openings that would justify such a clarification—
and further justify adopting an activity-based arm-of-the-state in-
quiry. Commentators have dismissed the consequences of the 
activity-based approach and criticized the Court for “ma[king] 
possible the contradiction where a type of entity can be an arm of 
the state in one instance but not be an arm of the state in another 
instance.”129 But this is precisely the approach this Comment 
 
 125 547 US 189 (2006). 
 126 Id at 192. 
 127 Id at 197 (emphasis added). 
 128 Id at 195. 
 129 Bilsborrow, Comment, 64 Emory L J at 826 (cited in note 76). See also, for example, 
Rogers, Note, 92 Colum L Rev at 1275 & n 152 (cited in note 25) (describing an activity-based 
analysis by the First Circuit before it adopted the entity-based approach as “novel and 
rather dubious” because “Eleventh Amendment immunity would be qualified rather than 
absolute, a distinction that lacks both textual and precedential support”). This criticism 
was overstated at the time it was made and is even more erroneous today. Alex Rogers’s 
only support consists of a Ninth Circuit opinion rejecting activity-based arm-of-the-state 
reasoning, Durning v Citibank, N.A., 950 F2d 1419, 1426 (9th Cir 1991), and a line in 
passing by the Supreme Court that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against agencies 
“regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” Pennhurst State School & Hospital v Halderman, 
465 US 89, 100 (1984). That a defendant may be immune in a suit for damages or injunc-
tive relief hardly determines that the arm-of-the-state inquiry cannot be an activity-spe-
cific analysis. Further, subsequent decisions such as Hess and Regents have created openings 
for an activity-based approach since the decisions in Durning and Halderman. See 
Part I.B. See also Taylor Simpson-Wood, While It May Be True That “the King Can Do No 
Wrong,” What about His Offspring?: The Labyrinthine Law of Arm-of-the-State Immunity 
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advances because it most accurately reflects and protects the sov-
ereign immunity concerns that motivated the arm-of-the-state 
doctrine in the first place. Indeed, courts adjudicating “arm of the 
sentencing judge” immunity recognize that the word “arm” does 
not require that an actor always be or not be such a limb.130 Fur-
ther, the Court’s arm-of-the-state opinions have created openings 
to address and clarify the scope of the analysis. The Court should 
take this opportunity to endorse an activity-based approach. This 
would provide a consistent level of abstraction at which the lower 
courts can operate, allowing the Court to more clearly evaluate 
the various factors and possibly clarify the significance of each. It 
would also ensure that the Eleventh Amendment’s protection ap-
plies only to action truly attributable to the state’s influence. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IN THE ARM-OF-THE-STATE DOCTRINE 
In light of the Court’s general lack of clarity regarding what 
factors courts should consider, the circuits have developed their 
own various arm-of-the-state tests. Most commentators seeking 
to impose more order onto the arm-of-the-state doctrine write 
about which considerations should be given more weight, rather 
than the level of abstraction at which these considerations should 
be evaluated.131 This Comment examines the uncertainty on the 
latter point. 
The circuit split derives from disagreement on whether an 
entity must only have one arm-of-the-state status. Most circuits 
assume that entities have only one status. These courts thus ap-
ply their arm-of-the-state factors to the entity as a whole rather 
than only to the relevant activity. Most commentators agree with 
this approach, dismissing out of hand the possibility that an en-
tity could simultaneously be an arm of the state for some purposes 
and not an arm of the state for others.132 
 
Examined through the Prism of Port Authorities, 5 SC J Intl L & Bus 153, 164 (2009) 
(describing the Supreme Court as “blazing a jurisprudential path that can only be charac-
terized as divisive”); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Juris-
diction, 115 Harv L Rev 1559, 1564 (2002) (noting that “[t]hese decisions have generated 
an outcry in the academy”). 
 130 See Walrath v United States, 35 F3d 277, 281–82 (7th Cir 1994) (providing an 
overview of circuits’ general agreement that absolute immunity is appropriate when an 
“official’s responsibilities are closely analogous to the adjudicative functions of a judge, or 
are ‘intimately associated’ with the judicial process itself”). 
 131 See note 113. 
 132 See, for example, Needle, Note, 6 Rev Litig at 212 (cited in note 77) (dismissing 
the possibility that “an essentially non-‘arm of the State’ entity may in some of its activi-
ties qualify as an ‘arm of the State’”); Bilsborrow, Comment, 64 Emory L J at 826 (cited in 
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This Comment refers to this more common conception as 
“entity-based” thinking. A holding under the entity-based ap-
proach is problematically broad. Barring a change in the state law 
makeup of an entity, the entity-based approach predetermines 
the arm-of-the-state status for every future suit concerning the 
defendant. 
Meanwhile, this Comment’s proposed approach is “activity-
based.” This approach considers arm-of-the-state test factors only 
as they apply to the activity at issue.133 It results in much nar-
rower holdings, such as the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that a local 
sheriff is an arm of the state solely “with respect to feeding in-
mates.”134 These narrow holdings better reflect the intricate 
power allocations between state and local entities in modern 
government. 
A. The Entity-Based Approach 
The abstract, entity-based approach is much more common 
among the circuits than the activity-based approach. This Section 
uses the DC and First Circuits to illustrate the broad themes of 
the entity-based side of the circuit split.135 It then discusses the 
inherent tension between the entity-based approach and the 
money judgment factor in particular, which further illustrates 
how this approach cannot achieve the motivating purposes of the 
Eleventh Amendment in the modern age. 
 
note 76) (calling such a duality a “contradiction”); Farr v Chesney, 441 F Supp 127, 131 
(MD Pa 1977) (“[T]he Court is not convinced that a particular agency can be both statewide 
and local in nature so that only a portion of its activities are protected by the Eleventh 
Amendment.”). 
 133 For circuits not currently employing an activity-based approach, this Comment 
recommends adopting the municipal liability doctrine’s method for defining the activity at 
issue. See Part III. 
 134 Lake v Skelton, 840 F3d 1334, 1342 (11th Cir 2016). 
 135 For examples of other circuits’ entity-based approaches, see Gorton v Gettel, 554 
F3d 60, 62 (2d Cir 2009); Karns v Shanahan, 879 F3d 504, 513 (3d Cir 2018); United States 
v Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, 745 F3d 131, 136–38 (4th Cir 2014); 
United States v University of Texas Health Science Center–Houston, 544 Fed Appx 490, 
494–95 (5th Cir 2013); Kreipke v Wayne State University, 807 F3d 768, 774–75 (6th Cir 
2015); Parker v Franklin County Community School Corp, 667 F3d 910, 926–29 (7th Cir 
2012); Public School Retirement System of Missouri v State Street Bank & Trust Co, 640 
F3d 821, 827, 830 (8th Cir 2011) (stating that “[c]ourts generally assess an entity’s inde-
pendence in comparison to the type of independence that a political subdivision possesses,” 
and that the monetary judgment question “is one of ‘potential’ benefit [to the State], how-
ever; whether a money judgment in this particular case will actually benefit [the State’s] 
treasury is not the relevant inquiry”) (emphasis added); Colby v Herrick, 849 F3d 1273, 
1276–77 (10th Cir 2017). 
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Each circuit structures its own test with different factors, as-
signed weights, and rationales. Despite these differences, all entity-
based circuits share the notion that an arm-of-the-state status 
must be evaluated in the abstract and apply to all of the entity’s 
various activities. The DC Circuit explains the entity-based ap-
proach succinctly: 
The status of an entity does not change from one case to the 
next based on the nature of the suit, the State’s financial re-
sponsibility in one case as compared to another, or other var-
iable factors. Rather, once an entity is determined to be an 
arm of the State under the [DC Circuit’s] three-factor test, 
that conclusion applies unless and until there are relevant 
changes in the state law governing the entity.136 
The DC Circuit evaluates how the state characterizes the en-
tity’s functions generally.137 Citing both Hess and Lake Country, 
the DC Circuit has characterized the question as “whether [the 
entity] performs functions typically performed by state govern-
ments, as opposed to functions ordinarily performed by local gov-
ernments or non-governmental entities.”138 In Puerto Rico Ports 
Authority v Federal Maritime Commission,139 the circuit court re-
viewed the Federal Maritime Commission’s determination that 
the Ports Authority was not an arm of Puerto Rico and thus not 
entitled to sovereign immunity in an action brought by terminal 
operators alleging violations of the Shipping Act of 1984.140 The 
court concluded that while the various functions performed were 
“not readily classified as typically state” functions, the state’s en-
abling act for the entity had a state-wide purpose.141 This act, it 
explained, “point[ed] in the direction of arm-of-the-[state] status.”142 
The above analysis shows that the DC Circuit employs an ab-
stract, entity-based test, focusing on the cumulative characteriza-
tion of all of an entity’s legal purposes. Like the Hess Court, the 
DC Circuit does not clarify what percentage of an entity’s activi-
ties must be state-related, or how important a state-dictated ac-
tivity must be, for the entity to qualify as an arm of the state. And 
 
 136 Puerto Rico Ports Authority v Federal Maritime Commission, 531 F3d 868, 873 
(DC Cir 2008). 
 137 Id at 875. 
 138 Id. 
 139 531 F3d 868 (DC Cir 2008). 
 140 Id at 870–71. 
 141 Id at 875, quoting Hess, 513 US at 45. 
 142 Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 531 F3d at 876. 
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unlike Lake Country, the DC Circuit seems unconcerned with 
identifying a “primary” function or activity that gave rise to the 
entity’s being.143 
Meanwhile, the First Circuit employs another test that oper-
ates at the same broad level of abstraction. Its two-step arm-of-
the-state test asks only how the state has structured the entity 
and then, “[i]f the structural indicators point in different direc-
tions,” about the impact on the state’s treasury.144 In Fresenius 
Medical Care Cardiovascular Resources, Inc v Puerto Rico and the 
Caribbean Cardiovascular Center Corp,145 the First Circuit con-
sidered whether a public corporation hospital was an arm of the 
state in a breach of contract action.146 It evaluated Puerto Rico’s 
constitution, the entity’s enabling legislation and mission, and 
the entity’s general work.147 It concluded that the entity competes 
with “[a] mosaic of medical providers . . . and nothing about [it] 
marks it as serving a uniquely governmental function.”148 Again, 
this illustrates an abstract evaluation of the entity’s cumulative 
functions and defining legal language, not an evaluation focusing 
on the legal language defining the relevant activity or facts. The 
court also noted that there is “a fair degree of control” exerted by 
the state over some areas of the entity’s activity, such as periodic 
audits, annual report requirements, and occasional gubernatorial 
intervention on management and personnel issues.149 The court 
did not mention which activities were at issue in either its discus-
sion of the entity’s general activities or its discussion of the state’s 
relative levels of control. It merely mentioned the facts cursorily 
in the beginning of its opinion.150 Instead, it kept its analysis 
broad—applicable to the entity’s entire span of possible actions 
and detached from the facts. 
 
 143 Lake Country, 440 US at 402. 
 144 Fresenius Medical Care Cardiovascular Resources, Inc v Puerto Rico and the 
Caribbean Cardiovascular Center Corp, 322 F3d 56, 65 (1st Cir 2003). 
 145 322 F3d 56 (1st Cir 2003). Notably, this opinion declared a new test, getting rid of 
a prior approach that allowed “sovereign immunity [to] var[y] from case to case, depending 
on the entity’s function at issue.” Orocovis Petroleum Corp v Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 
2010 WL 3981665, *1 (D Puerto Rico). 
 146 Fresenius, 322 F3d at 59. 
 147 Id at 68–75. 
 148 Id at 71. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Fresenius, 322 F3d at 59 (noting that plaintiff’s claim was for breach of contract 
and of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). For a similarly broad applica-
tion of the control factor in the entity-based approach, see Karns, 879 F3d at 518. 
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B. The Activity-Based Approach 
The Eleventh Circuit is the only circuit that applies a con-
sistent activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine in all contexts.151 
Like the other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has its own factors: 
it first determines “the particular function in which the defendant 
was engaged when taking the actions” giving rise to the suit (what 
this Comment calls the activity hinge); and secondly determines 
“whether the defendant is an ‘arm of the State’ in his performance 
of the function.”152 That second step includes factors such as state 
law definitions of the entity, degree of state control, funding 
sources, and who would bear any monetary judgment.153 The cir-
cuit applies these factors in a way that “evaluate[s] both the [en-
tity’s] governmental structure . . . vis-à-vis the State and the func-
tions in issue.”154 
This articulation of the test illustrates how the choice be-
tween activity-based and entity-based approaches effectively con-
trols the scope of a court’s application of its other relevant factors. 
This choice serves as a hinge for broadening or narrowing the 
scope of the total inquiry. For example, in Manders v Lee,155 a 
§ 1983 excessive force action against a county and the sheriff in 
his official capacity, the Eleventh Circuit appeals court evaluated 
its other arm-of-the-state test factors—such as state control, 
funding, and impact on the state treasury—solely as they related 
to the activity at issue in the case.156 It did not look to the entity-
wide distribution of these factors. 
In Lake v Skelton,157 the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its 
activity-based approach.158 It first used state law to define the rele-
vant activity as “providing food to inmates.”159 It then used the 
Georgia state constitution’s definition of sheriffs as “constitu-
tional officer[s] of the state,” and the state’s direct assignment of 
responsibility to feed inmates to sheriffs rather than to other local 
 
 151 The Supreme Court has slipped into activity language at least once, without clarify-
ing whether this signaled a change in the doctrine or was merely an oversight. See Northern 
Insurance Co, 547 US at 197. See also notes 130–33. 
 152 Lake, 840 F3d at 1337. See also Pellitteri v Prine, 776 F3d 777, 779 (11th Cir 2015) 
(restating the “particular function” scope of the circuit’s inquiry). 
 153 Lake, 840 F3d at 1337–38. 
 154 Id. 
 155 338 F3d 1304 (11th Cir 2003). 
 156 Id at 1318–28 (applying the various factors to the function giving rise to the suit). 
 157 840 F3d 1334 (11th Cir 2016). 
 158 Id at 1337–38. 
 159 Id at 1339. 
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entities, to conclude that Georgia sheriffs were arms of the state 
in the context of providing food for inmates.160 
The specificity of the activity-based approach allowed the 
Lake court to concentrate on the state law provisions relevant to 
the activity at issue rather than getting lost in those delineating 
other sheriff-related services and obligations. Although the state 
law’s definition of the sheriff as a state official would have been 
relevant in an entity-based analysis as well, it would have been 
considered alongside all other state law provisions and activities 
performed by the sheriff’s office. This may well have resulted in 
the food provisions being outweighed by other provisions charac-
terizing the office as more local than state in nature. An entity-
based court might conclude that the sheriff’s office as a whole is a 
“local” office and thus withhold sovereign immunity—even 
though providing food specifically is a “state” activity. In contrast, 
according to an activity-specific approach, the sheriff’s state law 
characterization mattered only in relation to the function of 
providing inmates with food, which the Lake court concluded was 
a state activity.161 No other state law provisions or activities were 
relevant. As such, the activity-based approach may result in more 
specific, tailored, and even different results in arm-of-the-state 
inquiries than those of entity-based approaches. The activity-
based approach reaches these results because it narrows the 
scope of the court’s evaluation of the relevant state law provisions, 
levels of state control, and other factors to only consider the entity 
activity giving rise to the suit. Thus, adopting an activity-based 
approach is akin to adopting a hinge that alters the scope of the 
inquiry. 
This attention to scope is an advantage over the entity-based 
approach, which necessarily results in under- and overinclusive 
arm-of-the-state status holdings. If an entity-based approach 
were taken with the Lake case, for example, the court would have 
considered how much control the state has over the sheriff gener-
ally, not with respect to the activity of feeding inmates. Evaluat-
ing Georgia law’s treatment of sheriffs broadly, the court possibly 
would conclude that the sheriff’s activities as a whole were more 
local than state in character. This evaluation would likely lead 
the court to conclude that the sheriff is never an arm of the state—
a broad holding that subjects the sheriff to future liability even in 
 
 160 Id at 1339–42. 
 161 Lake, 840 F3d at 1339–42. 
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cases in which the state ordered him to act in a certain way. Thus, 
the entity-based approach does not adequately align influence or 
control with liability. In doing so, it undermines the Eleventh 
Amendment’s goals of protecting only state or state-directed 
activity. 
C. Instances of Internal Struggle within Entity-Based Circuits 
Suggest That the Arm-of-the-State Doctrine Needs an 
Activity-Based Update 
Occasionally, entity-based circuits briefly illustrate the entity-
based arm-of-the-state doctrine’s inability to capture modern 
state-local power relationships or do substantive justice. This Sec-
tion discusses two examples of these instances. The first example, 
provided by the Ninth Circuit, shows how entity-based courts can 
twist their doctrine to include more activity-specific reasoning 
when facing specific types of defendants—in this example, law 
enforcement defendants. This may be an effort to do substantive 
justice in particularly charged contexts, wherein the defendant 
entities elude the entity-based approach’s broad categorizations. 
The second example details how entity-based courts struggle with 
the monetary judgment factor, a driving impetus for the Eleventh 
Amendment, because this factor does not lend itself to entity-
based reasoning. These examples suggest that in order to achieve 
the Eleventh Amendment’s core motivations today, the doctrine 
must adapt to an activity-based model. 
1. The Ninth Circuit’s struggle with law enforcement 
defendants. 
While the Ninth Circuit remains steadfast in its support for 
the entity-based version of the doctrine, its lower courts brush 
aside aspects of this doctrine in cases that prove especially trou-
blesome. This creates internal inconsistency and weakens the 
arm-of-the-state doctrine’s potential to do substantive justice gen-
erally, even if it achieves that justice in a particular case. 
The Ninth Circuit set out its arm-of-the-state test in Mitchell 
v Los Angeles Community College District:162 
[1] whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state 
funds, [2] whether the entity performs central governmental 
functions, [3] whether the entity may sue or be sued, 
 
 162 861 F2d 198 (9th Cir 1988). 
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[4] whether the entity has the power to take property in its 
own name or only the name of the state, and [5] the corporate 
status of the entity.163 
The circuit evaluates these factors “in light of the way [state] law 
treats the governmental agency.”164 The phrasing of these factors 
suggests that the Ninth Circuit intended to advance an entity-
based arm-of-the-state test. Indeed, the holding in Mitchell itself 
was broad and applied to all potential activities performed by the 
defendant.165 However, Ninth Circuit courts are quite attentive to 
context when dealing with law enforcement defendants.166 The cir-
cuit has not clarified the reasons for this minor shift into activity-
based thinking. It may be that Ninth Circuit courts felt more com-
pelled to do substantive justice for the plaintiffs within the 
charged context of civil rights claims against law enforcement de-
fendants. Whatever the reason, the Ninth Circuit unofficially de-
cided to move away from its entity-based arm-of-the-state ap-
proach in the law enforcement context.  
In Streit v County of Los Angeles,167 the plaintiffs sought dam-
ages for overdetention under § 1983 against the county and the 
sheriff’s department.168 In evaluating whether the sheriff’s de-
partment was an arm of the state, the circuit court first laid out 
the entity-based Mitchell factors and then conducted its analysis 
of those factors that were amenable to activity-specific thinking 
at an activity-specific level.169 It evaluated whether the monetary 
judgment in this particular case would run against the state 
treasury and whether the particular activity was a “central gov-
ernment function.”170 The last three Mitchell factors do not lend 
 
 163 Id at 201. 
 164 Holz v Nenana City Public School District, 347 F3d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir 2003), 
quoting Belanger v Madera Unified School District, 963 F2d 248, 251 (9th Cir 1992). 
 165 See Mitchell, 861 F2d at 201 (“We hold that, under California law, the district is a 
state entity that possesses eleventh amendment immunity.”). 
 166 See Roe v County of Lake, 107 F Supp 2d 1146, 1148 (ND Cal 2000) (explaining 
that “a sheriff may act for the State and the county in different capacities”); Holz, 347 F3d 
at 1181 (reviewing its entity-based circuit precedent as to school districts, which directs 
that “school districts in California are arms of the state” and “school districts in Nevada 
are not arms of the state”) (emphasis in original). 
 167 236 F3d 552 (9th Cir 2001). 
 168 Id at 556. 
 169 Id at 566–67. 
 170 Id at 567. Occasionally, Ninth Circuit courts apply the Mitchell monetary judg-
ment factor in a suit-specific way in non-law enforcement contexts, further illustrating the 
lack of clarity as to the scope of its inquiry. See Laurie Q. v Contra Costa County, 304 F 
Supp 2d 1185, 1202 (ND Cal 2004) (noting that “the state would possess no legal liability 
for any money judgment against the County premised on the violations alleged in this 
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themselves to activity-based thinking. The court conducted an 
entity-based analysis and found the “record [ ] bare with respect 
to the remaining two factors.”171 After this mixed arm-of-the-state 
analysis, the court reached an activity-based conclusion, holding 
that the sheriff’s department “is not an arm of the state of 
California in its administration of the local county jails.”172 This 
is a marked contrast from the circuit’s arm-of-the-state doctrine 
jurisprudence regarding other types of entities. When evaluating 
the arm-of-the-state status of school districts,173 state-created 
commissions,174 or air pollution control districts,175 for example, 
Ninth Circuit courts evaluate all of the Mitchell factors, except 
occasionally the monetary judgment factor, at the entity-based 
level. This contrast in approaches suggests that the Ninth Circuit 
recognized the flaws in the entity-based approach and found that 
they were too much to bear in the law enforcement civil rights 
context. 
Since the Ninth Circuit adopted an activity-based arm-of-the-
state analysis as to law enforcement defendants, it has progres-
sively reduced the significance of this analysis in this context such 
that the municipal liability doctrine effectively controls. The 
courts possibly found the internal inconsistencies caused by 
maintaining an activity-specific subset within their entity-based 
doctrine untenable. For example, in Elfand v Freitas,176 the plain-
tiff, a formerly incarcerated individual, alleged that county prison 
officials violated his First Amendment rights when they refused 
to give him certain magazines.177 He requested injunctive relief 
and monetary damages.178 The court considered the defendant 
sheriff’s claim that “he, other jail staff, and the County of Sonoma 
are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.”179 It 
characterized the claim as an arm-of-the-state claim, citing 
 
action”). But see Holz, 347 F3d at 1182–85 (evaluating in a partly entity-based way the 
funding structure of Alaska public schools). 
 171 Streit, 235 F3d at 567. 
 172 Id. 
 173 See Holz, 347 F3d at 1181; Savage v Glendale Union High School, District Number 
205, Maricopa County, 343 F3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir 2003). 
 174 See Sornson v Oregon Commission on Children, 887 F Supp 2d 1111, 1119 (D Or 
2012) (finding that the defendant performs central government functions in general). 
 175 See Beentjes v Placer County Air Pollution Control District, 397 F3d 775, 782–84 
(9th Cir 2005) (evaluating the central government function factor in general). 
 176 2012 WL 850737 (ND Cal). 
 177 Id at *1. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id at *6. 
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Mount Healthy and Regents to explain the doctrine and its adher-
ence to state law characterizations.180 However, it then went on to 
cite the Ninth Circuit’s definitive case on the municipal liability 
doctrine and Streit’s arm-of-the-state analysis in the same breath, 
concluding that the defendants were not arms of the state for pur-
poses of this particular action.181  
Similarly, in Hurth v County of Los Angeles,182 the court im-
plied that the municipal liability and arm-of-the-state doctrines 
apply the same test. The court issued an order for supplemental 
briefing “regarding the legal status” of the sheriff’s department 
“under California law,” in response to the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss the sheriff’s department from the suit.183 It wrote that the 
“true question . . . is whether the Sheriff’s Department is a subdi-
vision of the state” or “of the municipality.”184 It discussed arm-of-
the-state and municipal liability precedents alongside each other 
without drawing any distinction between the two and concluded 
that further briefing on state law characterization would answer 
its stated question.185 After taking it under consideration, the 
court rejected the motion to dismiss on the ground that according 
to Ninth Circuit precedent, “a California county sheriff is a mu-
nicipal, not state, actor when engaged in law enforcement func-
tions such as investigating crime (which is the function at issue 
in the present case).”186 In coming to this conclusion, the court cited 
only municipal liability doctrine precedents, further demonstrat-
ing the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s gradual irrelevance in the 
Ninth Circuit law enforcement context. Perhaps responding to 
this trend, law enforcement defendants in the Ninth Circuit tend 
to bring municipal liability arguments rather than arm-of-the-
state arguments when attempting to avoid litigation.187 
 
 180 Elfand, 2012 WL 850737 at *6. 
 181 Id, citing Brewster v Shasta County, 275 F3d 803, 805–06 (9th Cir 2001) and Streit, 
236 F3d at 567. 
 182 2009 WL 10699013 (CD Cal). 
 183 Id at *3. See also id at *1. 
 184 Id at *2 (emphasis in original). 
 185 Id at *2–3. 
 186 Hurth v County of Los Angeles, 2009 WL 10696491, *3 (CD Cal) (order denying 
defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
 187 See Prescott v County of Stanislaus, 2010 WL 3783950, *3 (ED Cal); Armstrong v 
Siskiyou County Sheriff’s Department, 2008 WL 686888, *5–7 (ED Cal). Even cases that 
have cited Streit only cited to its discussion of municipal liability. See Payne v County of 
Calaveras, 2018 WL 6593347, *3 (ED Cal); Brass v County of Los Angeles, 328 F3d 1192, 
1195 (9th Cir 2003); Kei Wei Lei v City of Oakland, 2018 WL 7247172, *2 (ND Cal). 
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* * * 
In short, the example discussed above shows an entity-based 
arm-of-the-state circuit struggling to reconcile the different 
scopes of the various immunity doctrines, as well as these doc-
trines’ different purposes. Notably, the circuit decided it would be 
easier to just not mention the arm-of-the-state doctrine in partic-
ularly challenging contexts—those involving officials or entities 
that perform a fair number of both state and local activities—
rather than face the question of the entity-based approach’s ca-
pacity head on. This end result suggests that while the entity-
based arm-of-the-state approach is more popular, its internal co-
herence and ability to achieve Eleventh Amendment objectives 
are suspect. 
Despite this reluctance to challenge the status quo, courts do 
not need to feel constrained by potentially overbroad entity-based 
holdings. These holdings, and entity-based courts’ efforts to re-
duce the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s relevance in challenging con-
texts, are leading the doctrine’s slow descent into incoherence. 
Circuits can deploy the arm-of-the-state doctrine in an activity-
specific way, ensuring that local entities bear the liabilities for 
truly local activities but not for state-mandated activities. While 
other immunity doctrines could just step in and achieve this re-
sult—as the Ninth Circuit’s evolution in the law enforcement con-
text demonstrates—adapting the arm-of-the-state doctrine so 
that it can function in the modern world is a worthy goal. Entity-
based courts seem to dislike acknowledging what would be logi-
cally consistent outcomes according to their entity-based arm-of-
the-state reasoning: that an official might act for the state or the 
locality while never being an arm of the state (or while always 
being an arm of the state). This aversion risks both doctrinal in-
consistency and a lack of judicial attention to federalism princi-
ples. An activity-based arm-of-the-state test would ensure that 
the Eleventh Amendment’s particular constitutional objectives 
continue to get the attention they deserve by forcing courts to for-
mally consider the state interests that bear on local action. As 
states continue to narrowly but forcefully direct predominantly 
local entities such as police departments, it is crucial that courts 
apply the arm-of-the-state doctrine with a scalpel rather than a 
hammer.188 
 
 188 For example, California’s “Sanctuary City” law explicitly removes local law en-
forcement officials’ discretion in the immigration enforcement context. See Cal Govt Code 
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2. The revelatory struggle to reconcile entity-based 
reasoning with the Eleventh Amendment’s foundational 
monetary judgment factor. 
The monetary judgment factor is included, under varying 
names, within every arm-of-the-state test. Courts give this factor 
particular weight when applying the doctrine because it reflects 
one of the Eleventh Amendment’s motivating concerns.189 Its sig-
nificance makes the entity-based circuits’ struggle with how to fit 
it into their tests particularly revealing. These struggles bolster 
the constitutional and purposivist arguments for shifting to an 
activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine, which would better 
achieve the Eleventh Amendment’s goal of protecting the state 
purse. 
While most of the factors in the various entity-based circuit 
tests emphasize the entity’s status generally, these tests occasion-
ally consider the monetary judgment factor with respect to the 
facts of the case—that is, asking whether this particular judg-
ment would run against the state treasury. The Supreme Court 
has provided little clarity on what monetary features matter, and 
the entity-based circuits struggle to reconcile the Court’s atten-
tion to the monetary impact of a given suit with the notion that 
they should focus on the entity’s broad characteristics. A survey 
of the entity-based circuits reveals strained efforts to make sense 
of the Court’s unclear guidance while still imposing entity-based 
formalities on the doctrine. For example, the Fifth Circuit treats 
this “most important” factor, which it terms “the source of the en-
tity’s funding,” as a “two-part inquiry.”190 It first considers “the 
state’s liability for any judgment” against the defendants at issue 
and then considers the state’s “liability for [the entity’s] general 
 
§§ 7284, 7284.6(a)(2)–(6), 7282.5(a). An activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine would rec-
ognize that California law enforcement entities operate as arms of the state in this context, 
entitling them to sovereign immunity for suits arising from immigration enforcement ac-
tions, while not necessarily shielding them from suits arising from their other activities. 
Meanwhile, an entity-based approach would place enormous pressure on the arm-of-the-
state inquiry in this immigration context because the holding would control the entity’s 
arm-of-the-state status in every other suit, regardless of state control over the activity. 
Any conclusion would be both under- and overinclusive in its shielding of the entity. See 
also generally Arizona v United States, 567 US 387 (2012) (challenging SB 1070, an Arizona 
bill that required police officers to make warrantless arrests when they had probable cause 
to believe that the arrestee was an undocumented immigrant). 
 189 See Parts I.A.1, I.B. 
 190 Cozzo v Tangipahoa Parish Council—President Government, 279 F3d 273, 282 
(5th Cir 2002). 
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debts and obligations.”191 Thus, this entity-based test incorporates 
entity-based and activity-based analyses into this single factor, 
attempting to fulfill the Eleventh Amendment’s motivating mone-
tary judgment purpose while staying true to the circuit’s entity-
based reasoning. 
Other entity-based circuits treat the monetary judgment fac-
tor as a wholly activity-based inquiry alongside other purely 
entity-based inquiries. For example, in the Fourth Circuit, courts 
ask first “whether the state treasury will be liable for the judg-
ment,” and, if it will not be, they then “consider other factors.”192 
And still another circuit attempts to meld the fact-specific and 
abstract inquiries into one: the Eighth Circuit writes that a 
“State’s role in financing an entity’s operation can indicate 
whether a money judgment in favor of the entity may benefit the 
State’s treasury.”193 This circuit, invoking the Supreme Court’s 
language in Regents that “it is the entity’s potential legal liability 
. . . that is relevant,”194 phrased the monetary question as “one of 
‘potential’ benefit [ ]; whether a money judgment in this particu-
lar case will actually benefit the [state treasury] is not the rele-
vant inquiry.”195 
In entity-based circuit opinions, then, there is clear tension 
between the fact that the state may only pay for certain judg-
ments against an entity or an official and these courts’ view that 
an arm-of-the-state status is supposed to remain constant across 
all of an entity’s activities. The discussion in one Fourth Circuit 
opinion is particularly revealing. In Gray v Laws,196 a former sani-
tarian for the county health department sued the department, the 
county, and individuals after being fired.197 The lower court dis-
missed claims against the individuals in their official capacities 
on the ground that “in making employment decisions,” they “act 
on behalf of the state rather than the county” and thus receive 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.198 The appeals court admitted 
that “[i]t is often difficult to determine whether a government en-
tity with both state and local characteristics constitutes an ‘arm 
 
 191 Id. 
 192 Cromer v Brown, 88 F3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir 1996) . 
 193 Public School Retirement System of Missouri v State Street Bank & Trust Co, 640 
F3d 821, 830 (8th Cir 2011). 
 194 Regents, 519 US at 431. 
 195 Public School Retirement System of Missouri, 640 F3d at 830. 
 196 51 F3d 426 (4th Cir 1995). 
 197 Id at 429–30. 
 198 Id at 430. 
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of the state’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes.”199 However, it 
would not budge on its rhetorical commitment to the entity-based 
inquiry, even as it announced a test that included an activity-
specific question regarding the monetary judgment.200 Most point-
edly, it remarked that the district court had “mistakenly as-
sumed” that the Eleventh Amendment inquiry is “functional” be-
cause “the same individual is not always a state employee or 
always a county employee.”201 It attempted to clarify: 
While it is true that whether a judgment against an official 
is payable from the state treasury on occasion may depend 
upon the function being performed by the official . . . , the pri-
mary consideration of Eleventh Amendment immunity is 
whether the state is liable for the judgment against the em-
ployee, not the function performed by the employee.202 
This, of course, does not clarify how the Eleventh Amendment in-
quiry cannot be essentially “functional” as the district court 
claimed, because the function performed may determine whether 
the state is liable. These rhetorical efforts show a circuit straining 
to interpret Supreme Court precedent as justifying reducing the 
activity’s role in the monetary judgment question, even as the mo-
tivating purposes of the Eleventh Amendment counsel a contrary 
conclusion. 
In sum, these entity-based courts have struggled to achieve 
one of the Eleventh Amendment’s core purposes—protecting the 
state treasury—when various state and local purses face poten-
tial liability for entity action. By attempting to attribute entity-
based reasoning to Supreme Court precedents, these courts re-
veal that reasoning’s inadequacy. In fact, the openings created in 
those precedents,203 combined with the modern fact of intricate 
state-local relationships and payment arrangements, provide 
forceful reasons for adopting an activity-based arm-of-the-state 
doctrine. 
 
 
 
 
 199 Id at 431. 
 200 Gray, 51 F3d at 433–34. 
 201 Id at 435 (quotation marks omitted). 
 202 Id. 
 203 See Part I.C. 
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III.  REUNITING THE CIRCUITS AT AN ACTIVITY-SPECIFIC LEVEL: 
HOW IT CAN BE DONE 
The activity-based approach offers key policy advantages in 
terms of aligning liability with power and achieving substantive 
justice for plaintiffs and defendants. Part IV will further explain 
these more far-reaching rationales. In this Part, however, the fo-
cus is on how to achieve an activity-based arm-of-the-state doc-
trine. This Part lays out how the municipal liability doctrine of-
fers a means to achieving an activity-based arm-of-the-state 
doctrine by providing a state law-based framework for defining 
the relevant activity. This Part then justifies why the municipal 
liability doctrine specifically is the best guide for courts making 
the proposed adaptation. 
A. How Courts Can Use the Municipal Liability Doctrine to 
Achieve an Activity-Based Arm-of-the-State Approach 
A simple way to adopt an activity-based approach across cir-
cuits is to merely add a “hinge” factor to existing circuit tests that 
is inspired by the municipality liability analysis.204 The identifi-
cation of the relevant activity as defined by state law is the start-
ing point for both the municipal liability doctrine’s analysis and 
the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s various, circuit-specific steps. If 
a circuit can effectively adopt the municipal liability doctrine’s 
activity-defining framework in the form of a new factor within its 
existing arm-of-the-state test, then the rest of the existing steps 
in various arm-of-the-state tests will apply in a narrow, activity-
focused way. The circuit can still conduct its evaluation of the sub-
stance of the question—whether the entity is an arm of the state 
within that activity—according to its own interpretation of the 
Supreme Court’s arm-of-the-state precedents. 
The Eleventh Circuit provides an example of one way to in-
corporate an activity-based element. It has created a two-step 
arm-of-the-state test, in which it first “determine[s] the particular 
function” at issue and then considers various other factors as they 
apply to that function.205 The circuits need not completely follow 
 
 204 The substantive analysis and purposes of the municipal liability doctrine are ex-
plained in Part I.A.3. This Part focuses on this doctrine’s threshold determination of what 
level of abstraction is appropriate for conducting that substantive inquiry. This threshold 
process can be incorporated into the arm-of-the-state doctrine to create the activity-
specific update proposed in this Comment. 
 205 Lake, 840 F3d at 1337 (11th Cir 2016). See also Pellitteri v Prine, 776 F3d 777, 779 
(11th Cir 2015) (restating the “particular function” scope of the circuit’s inquiry). 
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the Eleventh or any other circuit’s test. This Comment’s proposed 
activity hinge factor would be added into the existing circuit tests, 
determining the scope of the tests’ other factors. This change 
would enable inter-circuit movement toward uniformity in the 
scope of each arm-of-the-state test while preserving some intra-
circuit traditions with respect to the precise elements each circuit 
considers. For example, there is no need for the First Circuit to 
cast off its existing arm-of-the-state test factors and adopt the 
Eleventh Circuit’s factors. The inclusion of an activity-defining 
hinge factor based on the municipal liability doctrine’s activity-
based framework would provide a sufficient change because it 
would require the circuit’s other factors to be evaluated in a more 
context-specific way. This better achieves the motivating con-
cerns behind the doctrine by ensuring that Eleventh Amendment 
immunity only covers activities in which an entity, which may do 
many acts largely irrelevant to and beyond the reach of the state, 
essentially functions as an arm of the state. 
It is possible to achieve a fundamental shift in scope without 
mandating a wholesale overhaul of every entity-based arm-of-the 
state test. As long as the Supreme Court has yet to clarify the 
relative importance of arm-of-the-state test factors, the circuits’ 
organization of those factors may remain the same. Consider the 
DC Circuit. This circuit has a three-part test that does not include 
any “function” or “activity” factor. Rather, it looks at “state intent, 
state control, and overall effects on the state treasury.”206 Supple-
menting these elements with a factor that focuses on the activity 
involved in the case at hand would anchor the whole inquiry in 
the facts of the case. The state control factor would be correspond-
ingly changed in scope to focus on state control with respect to the 
activity at issue, not state control over the entity broadly. State 
intent, which is the means by which the DC Circuit evaluates 
state law characterization of the entity, would similarly be 
changed: the factor would now focus on how state law treats the 
challenged activity. Adding an activity hinge factor to this cir-
cuit’s test—or any other entity-based test—would influence how 
the rest of the factors are applied. The activity hinge factor would, 
at minimum, limit the scope of the court’s evaluation and thus 
narrow the scope of the holding to situations in which the entity 
engages in those same activities. This reorientation is key to 
creating an arm-of-the-state doctrine that responds to modern 
 
 206 Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 531 F3d at 874. 
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structures of power between local entities and the states. It would 
ensure that when the state sufficiently influences a given activity, 
the entity does not face legal liability for following directions it 
may not disobey. At the same time, this activity-based approach’s 
limited scope means that future plaintiffs’ actions may proceed 
against the same entity regarding activities that afford that en-
tity more discretion and local control. 
Although this shift in scope would not mandate that the cir-
cuits change how they weigh each factor in their tests, it would 
accomplish two important tasks for the future of the arm-of-the-
state doctrine. First, it would allow the doctrine to do substantive 
justice across modern government. The Ninth Circuit, for exam-
ple, might find that the arm-of-the-state doctrine is appropriate 
for law enforcement inquiries after all, and this would allow the 
Eleventh Amendment’s federalist concerns to be fully represented 
in those cases. While the municipal liability doctrine can do sim-
ilar work in narrowing the focus of the state-local relationship in-
quiry, it does not formally and purposefully advance those same 
constitutional concerns and thus cannot be a fully adequate re-
placement for the arm-of-the-state doctrine. Second, adopting a 
clearly defined, uniform level of abstraction at which the doctrine 
operates will create an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clar-
ify the appropriate weight to give each factor. This is because nar-
rowing the scope of the test to the challenged activity removes any 
ambiguity over whether courts should consider control of the en-
tity generally or just control over the activity in question, deci-
sively settling on the latter. Clearly defining the scope would cre-
ate a collection of lower court opinions operating in the same 
framework, allowing the Supreme Court to more effectively eval-
uate the effects of each factor or test on outcomes. Perhaps if 
lower courts more clearly defined the scope of their arm-of-the-
state tests, the Supreme Court would be more willing to clarify 
which factors should be considered, and how important each fac-
tor should be. 
B. Why the Municipal Liability Doctrine Offers the Most 
Effective and Feasible Means for Making the Change to 
Activity-Based Reasoning 
The municipal liability doctrine provides a model for how to 
define entity activities using state law. As discussed in Part I.A.3, 
under the municipal liability doctrine, states may not be sued un-
der § 1983 as a matter of statutory construction, rather than as a 
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matter of doctrinal immunity. The doctrine defines “the state” for 
purposes of the statute according to a narrow, activity-specific 
analysis of state law.207 The municipal liability doctrine thus of-
fers an avenue by which the arm-of-the-state doctrine can adopt 
the activity-based approach of other immunity doctrines while re-
taining its special attention to how the state defines its own enti-
ties and their actions. This special attention ensures that the 
arm-of-the-state doctrine retains the same respect for state sov-
ereignty that animates its original source of authority: the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
This attention to state law and state sovereignty makes the 
municipal liability doctrine a thematically superior choice for the 
transition to an activity-based arm-of-the-state doctrine than the 
other immunity doctrines. Even though the other doctrines also 
occupy the activity-specific level of abstraction, their analyses do 
not offer any real guidance for the arm-of-the-state doctrine given 
its particular constitutional purposes. Other immunity doctrines 
have developed according to common law reasoning, shifting as 
defendants convince the Court that their activities fit within the 
objectives of ensuring efficient government while maintaining 
sufficient plaintiff redress.208 Meanwhile, the arm-of-the-state 
doctrine uses state law definitions to determine an entity’s status, 
which is arguably an effort by federal courts to show proper re-
spect for the states when deciding sovereign immunity questions. 
The arm-of-the-state doctrine also has remained loyal to the Elev-
enth Amendment’s motivating concerns of protecting state dig-
nity and financial solvency; the Court is generally unmoved by 
policy arguments that, for example, some local entities should be 
immune from suit for the sake of efficient government.209 Thus, 
the absolute immunity doctrines provide no applicable guidance 
on how to define the relevant activity. The municipal liability doc-
trine is the best, and indeed the only, candidate for this purpose. 
 
 207 See McMillian, 520 US at 795: 
[W]hile it might be easier to decide cases arising under § 1983 and Monell if we 
insisted on a uniform, national characterization for all sheriffs, such a blunder-
buss approach would ignore a crucial axiom of our government: the States have 
wide authority to set up their state and local governments as they wish. 
 208 See, for example, Burns v Reed, 500 US 478, 485 (1991) (explaining that “common-
law immunity [of prosecutors, judges, and grand jurors in certain activities] was viewed 
as necessary to protect the judicial process”). 
 209 See, for example, Hess, 513 US at 47 (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment’s 
“twin reasons for being” are state dignity and financial liability, and using state law in its 
evaluation). 
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As illustrated by the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, the munic-
ipal liability doctrine shares essential elements with an activity-
based arm-of-the-state test. As a threshold matter, both use state 
law to identify a relevant activity, and then, substantively, both 
evaluate the state-local relationship only within the context of 
that activity. Because all of the federal courts are familiar with 
the municipal liability doctrine’s threshold determination of the 
activity at issue, shifting to an activity-based arm-of-the-state 
doctrine would merely impose a framework they are already fa-
miliar with.210 
Further, the courts’ application of the municipal liability doc-
trine has been largely successful in terms of predictability and 
deterrent effect on entity and officer behavior.211 Of course, com-
mentators have suggestions on how to refine the municipal liabil-
ity doctrine to better achieve certain objectives,212 but this doc-
trine’s flaws seem salutary when compared to the issues in the 
 
 210 See McMillian, 520 US at 785 (“[T]he question is not whether Sheriff Tate acts for 
Alabama or Monroe County in some categorical, ‘all or nothing’ manner. . . . [We] ask 
whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a par-
ticular area, or on a particular issue.”). 
 211 See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect 
of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 Ga L Rev 845, 862–64 (2001) (“Holding the municipal-
ity itself liable for injuries caused by its own unconstitutional policies and customs makes 
it more difficult to take refuge in the ‘bad apply theory’ and more likely that the munici-
pality will take steps to remedy the broader problems.”); G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator’s View 
of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct Policy and Practice Cases, 48 DePaul L Rev 
747, 748 (1999) (arguing that in addition to helping plaintiffs reach the “municipal deep 
pocket,” municipal liability claims “facilitate the development of systemic evidence of de-
liberate indifference to police brutality”); Matthew J. Cron, et al, Municipal Liability: 
Strategies, Critiques, and a Pathway toward Effective Enforcement of Civil Rights, 91 Denver 
U L Rev 583, 606, 606–07 nn 171–73 (2014) (“For many plaintiffs, the potential of prevent-
ing future civil rights violations is significantly more important than receiving monetary 
compensation for their own injuries. To that end, many plaintiffs request (and receive) 
injunctive relief in municipal liability cases that may have no direct benefit to an individ-
ual plaintiff.”). 
 212 See, for example, Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability under Section 1983: Some 
Lessons from Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 Georgetown L J 1753, 1779 (1989) 
(arguing that the municipal liability doctrine’s “official policy” requirement “encourages 
courts to ask the wrong questions” and recommending a focus on private tort law concepts 
that establish “responsibility for the injury”); Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 
Colum L Rev 409, 478 (2016) (arguing that because “immunities for governmental agents 
and immunities for local entities often work in tandem to block constitutional accounta-
bility,” the municipal liability doctrine “should take this synergy into account”); Cron, et 
al, 91 Denver U L Rev at 604 (cited in note 211) (arguing that “courts have been hyper-
vigilant about protecting municipalities” and that their “high standards have resulted in 
a scarcity of successful municipal liability claims in the federal courts”). While those writ-
ers focus on repairing the doctrine, still some commentators would get rid of the doctrine 
entirely. See John C. Jeffries Jr, The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 Va L Rev 
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arm-of-the-state doctrine as currently conceived.213 And as a prac-
tical matter, municipal liability is here to stay: “[I]t [is] near-
delusionary to expect the Court to revisit its municipal liability 
jurisprudence.”214 Importing just the threshold inquiry of the mu-
nicipal liability doctrine is thus a feasible task. By adopting the 
municipal liability doctrine’s approach to defining a narrow, state 
law–responsive scope, the arm-of-the-state doctrine can become 
uniform at least in regard to its level of abstraction. 
IV.  REUNITING THE CIRCUITS AT AN ACTIVITY-SPECIFIC LEVEL: 
WHY IT SHOULD BE DONE 
This Part offers a brief explanation of how an activity-based 
arm-of-the-state approach better accomplishes the broad motiva-
tions behind sovereign immunity and achieves substantive justice 
in the modern world. 
A. Achieving Federalism’s Purposes within Modern 
Government 
The Eleventh Amendment’s “twin reasons for being,” the pro-
tection of state dignity and solvency,215 have become lost in cur-
rent government’s complicated, hybrid entities. While federalism 
scholars attempt to incorporate the growth of local power into 
their conceptions of constitutional action and sovereignty analyses, 
courts applying the Eleventh Amendment similarly struggle to 
identify, let alone protect, “state” action. The arm-of-the-state 
doctrine tries and fails to identify factors and relative weights 
that, applied to various entity actions, achieve the Amendment’s 
motivating purposes in a consistent, predictable way.216 The 
 
207, 249–50 (2013) (recommending a single liability rule for constitutional torts and, ac-
cordingly, the elimination of “the small pocket of strict liability created by Monell”). 
 213 See Simpson-Wood, 5 SC J Intl L & Bus at 153, 163–64 (cited in note 129) (describ-
ing the Supreme Court as “blazing a jurisprudential path that can only be characterized 
as divisive”); Nelson, 115 Harv L Rev at 1564 & n 17 (2002) (cited in note 129) (noting that 
“[t]hese decisions have generated an outcry in the academy”). 
 214 Avidan Y. Cover, Revisionist Municipal Liability, 52 Ga L Rev 375, 421 (2018) 
(noting the Court’s history with the doctrine and “principles of stare decisis, separation of 
powers, and . . . federalism,” and arguing that Congress should step in and create a bifur-
cated municipal liability regime). 
 215 Hess, 513 US at 47. 
 216 See Rogers, Note, 92 Colum L Rev at 1247–52 (cited in note 25) (explaining that 
the “growth and decentralization of modern state governments have exposed the deficien-
cies of [the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s] anachronistic approach” and that “courts cannot 
make principled distinctions”). 
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activity-based approach, by anchoring the existing factors in vari-
ous circuit tests to the activity at issue, at least recognizes that 
the relationship between a state and a local entity can vary across 
the latter’s many purposes. This narrower approach leaves less 
room for error—less irrelevant, complicated entity activity to get 
lost in. It perhaps even allows the courts to conduct the sort of 
narrow analysis that earlier justices likely anticipated in creating 
the arm-of-the-state doctrine, back when entities carried out only 
one or a couple activities. 
Local political subdivisions receive their power from the state 
itself, meaning that when the state withdraws discretion or local 
control from local officials, those local officials are not acting ac-
cording to their own designs.217 They have no choice but to accept 
the grant of power that the state gives them. As such, state legis-
latures have enormous power over all governmental entities at 
their disposal, whether they choose to exercise it or not. This re-
lationship between the state and its local governmental entities 
creates the possibility that local entities may be simultaneously 
carrying out local policy—acting in a largely autonomous, discre-
tionary way with power granted by the state—while also carrying 
out state policy that has been handed down from the capitol. 
Whether they focus on local concerns with local perspectives en-
tirely depends on the will of the state government. When the state 
hands down its chosen directives, the local entities charged with 
fulfilling those directives should be recognized as acting as arms 
of the state, for they have no choice in the matter and the state 
has removed their ability to exercise locally focused discretion. 
The contextual differences between state-mandated action and a 
hands-off grant of state power to local actors are stark and should 
be legally recognized in the sovereign immunity analysis. 
Within the municipal liability doctrine, some circuits already 
recognize this distinction. In the Second Circuit, a municipality 
can be held liable if it had some discretion under state law in the 
 
 217 City of Trenton v New Jersey, 262 US 182, 187 (1923): 
[A] municipalit[y] ha[s] no inherent right of self government which is beyond the 
legislative control of the State. . . . [It] is merely a department of the State, and 
the State may withhold, grant or withdraw powers and privileges as it sees fit. 
However great or small its sphere of action, it remains the creature of the State 
exercising and holding powers and privileges subject to the sovereign will. 
See also City of Columbus v Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc, 536 US 424, 428–29 
(2002) (“Ordinarily, a political subdivision may exercise whatever portion of state power 
the State, under its own constitution and laws, chooses to delegate to the subdivision.”). 
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matter and made a “conscious choice” to enforce an unconstitu-
tional state law provision.218 Meanwhile, if state law required mu-
nicipal enforcement of the unconstitutional provision or there was 
a general local policy to enforce all the state’s statutes, the mu-
nicipality could not be liable under the municipal liability doc-
trine.219 Thus, this doctrine recognizes that state laws vary in 
terms of how much discretion they grant municipalities in certain 
matters. This Comment proposes an analogous recognition in the 
arm-of-the-state doctrine: in activities in which state statutes 
force municipalities to act in a certain way, the municipality 
should be recognized as an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity for claims arising out of those actions. 
Notably, the activity-based approach would narrow the hold-
ing not to the facts themselves, but to something broader: the ac-
tivity in which defendants engaged.220 This scope is broad enough 
that precedent will be useful—it will prevent the inquiry from 
getting lost in the facts of what exactly local actors did in response 
to state influence. For example, if the local entity ignored the 
state’s direction and this disobedient action gave rise to a suit, the 
disobedience would not change the fact that the state held great 
sway over how the local entity performed that activity. The local 
actors in such a case would be entitled to sovereign immunity as 
an arm of the state, even though they did not actually follow the 
policy they were ordered to follow. Under the entity-based ap-
proach, the state’s power over that activity could be irrelevant to 
the arm-of-the-state conclusion if the entity strikes the court, ac-
cording to its various factors, as generally state-aligned or politi-
cally distinct. 
An outcome that apparently awards a disobedient local entity 
with sovereign immunity anyway may seem intuitively unfair. 
However, it ensures that the activity-based arm-of-the-state test 
retains its kinship with the Eleventh Amendment’s foundational 
concerns about state solvency and sovereign dignity. Recognizing 
an entity as an arm of the state when the state sufficiently influ-
ences local policy, even if this means entitling disobedient entities 
to sovereign immunity in those contexts, reinforces the strength 
 
 218 See Vives v City of New York, 524 F3d 346, 353 (2d Cir 2008). 
 219 Id. See Dina Mishra, Comment, Municipal Interpretation of State Law as “Con-
scious Choice”: Municipal Liability in State Law Enforcement, 27 Yale L & Pol Rev 249, 
249–51 (2008) (explaining the circuit split as to local flexibility’s significance in municipal 
liability claims and arguing that municipalities’ interpretations of ambiguous laws should 
be included in the inquiry). 
 220 McMillian, 520 US at 783. 
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of the state. It empowers the state to enforce its policies through 
public pressure or internal changes to the entity in the context it 
is deemed to essentially control. In contrast, an arm-of-the-state 
doctrine that implicitly recognizes local entity disobedience as le-
gitimate local action when the state has set a contrary policy 
would undermine the foundational rule of sovereign immunity. 
Such a doctrine suggests that local entities’ powers are not de-
rived from the state after all. 
The above analysis demonstrates how the arm-of-the-state 
doctrine can achieve the Eleventh Amendment’s motivating fed-
eralism purposes if properly altered in scope. Currently, at least 
one entity-based circuit attempts to avoid the doctrine’s over-
broad outcomes by maneuvering so that the arm-of-the-state doc-
trine need not apply at all in a given context.221 While at first 
glance the idea of simply replacing the arm-of-the-state doctrine 
with one of the many other activity-specific, immunity-like doc-
trines seems appealing, this is an ill-advised, shortsighted solu-
tion. It creates doctrinal incoherence within each circuit’s entity-
based doctrine and prevents the arm-of-the-state doctrine from 
reinforcing its important constitutional purposes within modern 
government’s diffuse, varied structure. The other, precisely tai-
lored immunity doctrines are intended to achieve different objec-
tives;222 none can provide a sufficiently complete replacement for 
another. Indeed, the arm-of-the-state doctrine’s monetary judg-
ment factor, roundly viewed as the most significant consideration 
in the analysis, seems to call for activity-based reasoning.223 To 
ensure that the motivating purposes of the Eleventh Amendment 
receive their due attention in adjudications involving state-local 
relationships, the doctrine tasked with advancing those purposes 
must adapt. 
B. Achieving Substantive Justice 
Aligning liability with power furthers substantive justice by 
accurately influencing potential parties’ behavior in the future. 
Entity-based arm-of-the-state doctrines cannot effectively do this. 
Consider, for example, some entity-based circuits’ evaluations of 
sheriffs. One Fifth Circuit panel applied the circuit’s six-factor 
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arm-of-the-state test to the parish-level office of a Louisiana sher-
iff and concluded that “a sheriff in Louisiana may not be properly 
characterized as an arm of the state.”224 This holding precludes 
potential immunity for sheriffs regarding any action at all—
even if the state requires the sheriff to adhere to a certain state 
legislature-directed policy.225 This overexposure to liability does 
not deter the state from creating and mandating harmful policies 
for the sheriff’s department to follow, and it can result in financial 
harm for local defendants. On the other side of the entity-based 
arm-of-the-state approach’s broad holdings, the Fourth Circuit 
applied its arm-of-the-state test to sheriff’s offices and concluded 
that South Carolina sheriffs are arms of the state.226 This creates 
error in the other direction: plaintiffs are unable to sue South 
Carolina sheriffs in their official capacities over entirely locally 
dictated policies. Neither of these decisions achieves substantive 
justice by creating accurate incentives for behavioral change. 
Both the defendant and plaintiff would prefer a more tailored 
arm-of-the-state analysis. From the defendant’s perspective, 
aligning liability with power is worthwhile because local entities 
receiving state directives in specific contexts should not be forced 
to pay for those policies’ harms, both as a normative matter and 
because there is no effective deterrence mechanism in holding the 
wrong entity accountable. From the plaintiff’s perspective, the ac-
tivity-based approach prevents locally determined policies from 
escaping federal adjudication because the entity or office gener-
ally has a close relationship with the state. And in policy-based 
suits, the sort of suits in which arm-of-the-state defenses would 
plausibly arise, a suit against an individual officer will likely fail 
to overcome qualified immunity.227 This reality makes suits 
against the local entity or office critical to plaintiffs’ chances for 
redress. If an entity or office can access the state’s sovereign im-
munity for every action it undertakes, plaintiffs are further sepa-
rated from justice. 
Burns v Reed228 provides an example of how activity-based 
immunity can more accurately align power with liability and thus 
achieve better substantive justice in each case. Here, a plaintiff 
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brought an action against a state prosecuting attorney for dam-
ages under § 1983 because the attorney had “giv[en] legal advice 
to the police and [ ] participat[ed] in a probable-cause hearing.”229 
The attorney asserted that both activities fell within the scope of 
absolute prosecutorial immunity, and he convinced both the dis-
trict and appeals courts to dismiss the case.230 The Court affirmed 
in part and reversed in part, entitling the attorney to absolute 
immunity for participating in the probable cause hearing but not 
for providing legal advice to police.231 Such a result, limited ac-
cording to activity, would be impossible under an entity-based 
arm-of-the-state test. Adopting an activity-based arm-of-the-state 
test across all suits—not just § 1983 claims—would create an 
Eleventh Amendment immunity defense that only reaches as far 
as necessary to protect sovereign interests. Further, there are no 
persuasive reasons why courts must use broad, bright-line rules 
in their arm-of-the-state analyses when they capably make fact-
specific inquiries in cases like Burns for the other immunity 
doctrines.232 
CONCLUSION 
Most circuits evaluate the arm-of-the-state status of an entity 
by looking at the entity as a whole, rather than focusing on the 
relationship between the entity and the state within the suit-
related activity. This approach does not achieve the purposes of 
the Eleventh Amendment itself, nor does it align with the nar-
rower conceptions of immunity seen in other immunity doctrines. 
An update is necessary to ensure that the arm-of-the-state doc-
trine achieves its constitutional purposes when applied to the 
complex state-local relationships that characterize modern gov-
ernment. Without that update, entity-based courts will likely con-
tinue to minimize the doctrine’s role in an ad hoc manner when 
faced with intricate relationships that the entity-based approach 
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cannot handle.233 This shortsighted solution creates incoherence 
within each circuit’s doctrine and removes the Eleventh 
Amendment’s core concerns of state sovereignty and solvency 
from the analysis of state-local power situations. Instead, the doc-
trine should be recuperated so that it functions as effectively as 
the other immunity doctrines in achieving its motivating consti-
tutional purposes. To reaffirm those constitutional concerns in 
courts’ analyses of modern governmental action, this Comment 
provides a means by which circuits can adopt an activity-based 
arm-of-the-state approach. 
Each circuit should introduce an activity hinge element into 
its existing arm-of-the-state test that serves to narrow the scope 
of the test’s other factors. The primary virtue of this approach is 
that it focuses the court’s eye on the state’s relationship with the 
entity within the relevant activity rather than across the entity a 
whole. The Eleventh Circuit already employs this activity-based 
approach and enjoys a relatively straightforward, internally co-
herent doctrine.234 Entity-based circuits may adopt this Com-
ment’s proffered approach while staying true to their own indi-
vidualized tests by using the municipal liability doctrine as a 
guide for the proposed activity hinge factor. They need only use 
the municipal liability doctrine’s guidance for identifying the rel-
evant activity according to state law. Clarifying the scope of the 
arm-of-the-state doctrine also provides an opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to conclusively identify what constitutes a proper 
arm-of-the-state test. 
An activity-based approach would ensure that the arm-of-
the-state doctrine fulfills its intended federalism objectives and 
does substantive justice in individual cases. It would anchor the 
many circuits’ various tests to the relevant facts and state law 
definitions, thus protecting the state’s sovereignty and solvency 
while ensuring plaintiffs’ ability to sue local entities over more 
locally controlled actions. And it would capture the realities of 
modern state-local relationships, assigning liabilities and im-
munities that align with actual allocations of power. 
Currently, entity-based circuits struggle to reconcile entity-
based reasoning with complicated state-local relationships. These 
struggles—particularly in relation to the doctrine’s foundational 
monetary judgment factor and its unavoidable, inherent activity-
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based features—suggest that the activity-based approach is truly 
the best way to achieve the Eleventh Amendment’s purposes in 
the present day.235 This Comment’s proffered approach would re-
habilitate the arm-of-the-state doctrine so that it achieves the 
Eleventh Amendment’s motivating purposes while also more ef-
fectively working substantive justice in individual cases by align-
ing power with liability. The arm-of-the-state doctrine would be 
capable of handling modern governmental arrangements in a 
world in which the relationships between states and local entities 
are ever more complex. 
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